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What does a democratic government look like? Countless scholars, politicians, and 
leaders have tried to define it, and countless others have tried to export or transplant democracy 
to countries they consider to be undemocratic. U.S. policy makers, among others in Western 
countries, assume that this form of government is not only the best form of government, but that 
it is universally desirable. Since its founding, the United States has believed that its liberal 
democracy, with a representative and divided government, as well as free trade and the 
protection of personal property rights, to be exemplary. We believe that we are unique: a shining 
city on the hill—an example for the rest of the world to follow. Historically, this phenomenon is 
known as American Exceptionalism.1 In fact, at various times, we have sought to both maintain 
and export our particular democratic practices so that others could follow our example. Thus, 
when it comes to democracy, the United States attempts to export its values because it believes it 
is exceptional. Yet time and time again, policy makers who seek to export democracy are met 
with disappointment and criticism. If in the future, the United States decides it again wants to 
pursue democratization abroad, it is necessary for policy makers to modify their practices, as 
recent attempts at democratization, most relevantly to this thesis in Haiti and Iraq, have only 
produced failures.  
Haiti and Iraq were chosen as the case studies for this project for several reasons. First, 
they represent two military interventions to promote democracy in modern history that came to 
be viewed as the central foreign policy initiatives of two U.S. presidents, only to end in disaster 
years down the road. Second, both efforts occurred as the world was entering a new era after the 
                                                
1 Alexis de Tocqueville. 2003. Democracy in America. London [u.a.]: Penguin books. p. 36. 
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end of the Cold War, giving U.S. policy makers unique opportunities to craft new foreign policy 
strategies. Finally, these two Presidents, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush, who initiated 
these interventions, represent the two major political parties that have endured in the United 
States for hundreds of years. These cases of military intervention are significant then, because 
they demonstrate continuity between Democratic and Republican administrations: regardless of 
party, democratization is an ongoing pillar of U.S. foreign policy—it is not a partisan issue. 
Thus, in the study of U.S. democratization efforts, Haiti and Iraq are important cases for 
understanding U.S. policy makers’ failures to export successful models of democracy.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I analyze the events in Haiti between 1991 and 1997 (the 
year the United Nations ended its mission in Haiti) and the events in Iraq between 2003 and 2006 
(the year in which the United States backed Maliki as Iraq’s Prime Minister). These dates were 
chosen not only because they encompass the duration of each intervention, but also because they 
provide perspectives on the damage done after each democratization project was prematurely 
labeled a “success.” In the Haiti case, success was announced upon Aristide’s return to his 
country in 1994, whereas in the Iraq case, success was announced upon the transfer of 
governance from the Coalition Provisional Authority to Iraq in 2004. Both military interventions 
began with US-led invasions to topple the current regime, hoping to secure democracy by force, 
and both ended in disaster. Despite these bookended similarities, the context for each case was 
very different, not to mention the geographic, cultural, economic, and political distinctions 
between the two. President Clinton, in attempting to stem the flow of drugs and refugees from a 
deteriorating Haiti while simultaneously balancing American ideals to maintain democracy and 
human rights around the world was backed into a corner by his own promises, and had no 
political choice but to invade. President Bush, on the other hand, had promised a war on terror 
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and the protection of the United States’ oil resources, as well as the promotion of democracy 
around the world, and delivered this promise in the form of a war on Iraq. One key similarity 
between these two cases, however, is the confidence of the United States that it would not only 
be simple to export democracy to a foreign country, but also universally welcomed. Furthermore, 
both cases exemplify the now widely discredited notion that conducting elections is synonymous 
with constructing democracy. Years later, these two countries are still grappling with the effects 
of the United States’ destructive decisions. So how is it that between two different 
administrations, opposing political parties, and ten years, similar mistakes were made? The 
important question I ask in this study is: in the Clinton and Bush administration’s attempts to 
implement democracy in Haiti and Iraq in 1994 and 2003, where did the democracy planners go 
wrong in their democratization efforts, and how did these mistakes further each country’s failure 
to democratize successfully?  
In order to understand these failures, we must begin by examining our understanding of 
democracy, and why, despite years of accumulated knowledge and presumably the best 
intentions, our aspirations for democratization continue to defy the timelines of many democracy 
planners, as well as the hopes of the states they attempt to democratize.2 This disconnect between 
the blueprints for democratization and the results of its implementation should lead one to define 
democracy more carefully. If U.S. foreign policy makers believe it is possible to model and 
export democracy, we must thoroughly define the characteristics of a working and sustainable 
democracy so we know the ways in which to assist in creating change in the future. By 
recognizing what democracy planners misinterpreted in their endeavors, we can modify practices 
                                                
2 Throughout this thesis, when referencing democracy, I am referring to the system of government, 
whereas when referencing democratization, I mean the practice of transitioning to a democratic political 
regime. In the case of Haiti and Iraq, this act of democratization occurred externally through the United 
States’ invasion of both countries.  
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of democratization for the future, should it ever be attempted again. Here, I am not advocating 
for such actions. Rather, I am suggesting that if a future administration pursues democratization 
abroad, it must be conducted with greater understanding of democracy, and fundamentally 
different implementation practices so that the United States does not wreak havoc in yet another 
state.  
The definitions of democracy should inform the blueprints for democratization. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, it is important to engage in the intellectual endeavor of 
illuminating previous scholarship on democracy and democratization because it is necessary to 
make clear what U.S. policy makers should be trying to achieve as well as the characteristics by 
which we can evaluate the Clinton and Bush administration’s attempts to export democracy to 
Haiti and Iraq. As a result of the findings in this study, I argue that due to an inadequate 
understanding of the universal characteristics of democracy, poor assessments of each country’s 
historical, political, and social contexts as they relate to democratization, and various obstacles to 
democracy (including competing incentives for the invasion), the Clinton and Bush 
administrations both failed to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq, and in fact left each 
country worse-off than it was before the United States’ involvement. Furthermore, these two 
examples suggest that the very practice of externally motivated and enforced democratization 
cannot lead to a sustainable democracy, unless policy practices are significantly modified in the 
future. Even though these countries are geographically, economically, and culturally very 
different, the Clinton and Bush administrations made similar mistakes in democracy planning in 
each, making the question of defining democracy and its relationship to democratization 
absolutely essential in any possible future endeavor.  
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This thesis proceeds in the following manner: The subsequent theoretical section 
identifies and expands upon several post-WWII democracy and democratization theories, chosen 
due to their significance and their representation of the field as a whole, and frequency of citation 
by other scholars of democracy. This selection includes theories of democracy, democratization, 
and transitional governments from authors such as Robert Dahl, Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, 
Seymour Lipset, Robert Putnam, Joseph Schumpeter, Arend Lijphart, and Samuel Huntington. 
According to available citation analysis metrics, Linz and Stepan, Lipset, Lijphart, Dahl, and 
Huntington’s most popular publications have been cited over 10,000 times each, with some cited 
up to approximately 45,000 times.3 Putnam and Schumpeter’s title works in this thesis have been 
cited approximately 37,000 times alone, not including their other popular publications.4 
Moreover, these authors have all been published in top tier journals in the field of political 
science according to the impact factor (h-index) of each journal. Thus, even decades later, 
political scholars and policy makers alike still see them as the benchmarks of democratization 
studies. In addition to this, I also bring in contemporary work done by authors such as Laurence 
Whitehead, Thomas Carothers, and Fareed Zakaria to represent the more recent trajectory of the 
academic field. These authors are by no means a complete selection, but for the purposes of this 
                                                
3 “Google Scholar Citation Search: Linz and Stepan,” last modified March 31, 2017, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Linz+and+Stepan&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36&oq=Linz+and
+, cited 13,519 times; “Google Scholar Citation Search: Seymour Lipset,” last modified March 31, 2017, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=+Lipset&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36, cited 17,374 times; 
“Google Scholar Citation Search: Arend Lijphart,” last modified March 31, 2017, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Lijphart&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36, cited 19,746 times; 
“Google Scholar Citation Search: Robert Dahl,” last modified March 31, 2017, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,36&q=author:Robert+author:Dahl, cited 30, 473 
times; “Google Scholar Citation Search: Samuel Huntington,” last modified March 31, 2017, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Samuel+Huntington&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36, cited 
45,123 times.  
4 “Google Scholar Citation Search: Robert Putnam,” last modified March 31, 2017, 
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Me4t2sQAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao, cited 37,213 times; “Google 
Scholar Citation Search: Joseph Schumpeter,” last modified March 31, 2017, 
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=eiol1dkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao, cited 37,971 times.  
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paper, they most effectively communicate a nuanced understanding of democracy and 
democratization. Next, I will apply the characteristics of democratic structures identified in the 
literature review to Haiti and Iraq in order to evaluate the military interventions in the two 
countries. To do this, I will provide an analytical structure differentiating the identified 
democratic characteristics into three categories. These three categories (Internal Characteristics 
Associated with Democracy, Universal Characteristics of Democracy, and Obstacles to 
Democracy) serve as the framework by which I consider each country.  
With Haiti, first I will examine the conditions in the country prior to the invasion, then 
look at the claims the democracy planners made regarding their democratization plans. Then, I 
analyze what actually occurred, followed by an explication of the aftermath. The chapter on Iraq 
will mirror in sequence the discussion of Haiti’s failed democratization. Finally, I will offer a 
comparison of the two cases together, thinking about what these patterns can tell us about 
democracy planning for the future. By building on the democracy theorists that I discuss, 
presenting new categories with which to evaluate democratization efforts, and closely assessing 
the United States’ failure to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq, this paper will contribute to 
the literature on democracy and democratization and offer lasting lessons for policy makers to 
take into consideration, should the United States (for better or for worse) continue to undertake 
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WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? 
 
In his seminal work, On Democracy, Robert Dahl traces the history of democratic 
societies over 2,500 years, and comes to the conclusion that effective democracies, no matter 
how varied, require a common set of fundamental standards.5 Dahl believes that democracy can 
be preserved and advanced, although there are key differences between an ideal and actual 
democracy. Ideal democracy relies on theoretical ideas and values that Dahl views are implicit in 
any democracy, which are not easily quantifiable. Actual or functional democracy, on the other 
hand, relies on key political institutions within the governing body of the state. In explaining 
ideal democracy, Dahl gives us five basic characteristics that every democracy must have. First, 
there must be equal and effective participation. Second, there must be voting equality. Third, 
there must be enlightened understanding. By this Dahl means that within reasonable time limits, 
each member of society must have equal and effective opportunities to learn about the 
government’s policies and subsequent consequences. Fourth, there must be control of the 
agenda: the members of the political society must have the exclusive opportunity to decide what 
matters are to be placed on the agenda. Fifth, there must be an inclusion of adults. While the list 
of characteristics for an ideal democracy is rather theoretical, as explained previously, Dahl’s list 
of fundamental necessities for a large, functional democracy is more specific, and recognizes the 
critical importance of institutions within a democracy.  
To understand the working democracy, we first need to decode what Dahl means when 
he says that political institutions are absolutely necessary in order to maintain a functional 
democracy. Dahl defines institutions as democratic arrangements, which gradually become 
practices, and then finally settle into institutions. Thus, the following institutions are required in 
order to achieve democratic goals: a large, successful democracy demands the practice of free, 
                                                
5 Robert A. Dahl. On Democracy. New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 1998. 
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fair, and frequent elections leading to elected officials, sustained freedom of expression, 
alternative sources of information (the media), associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship. 
Although the first three qualifications are fairly self-explanatory, the last two deserve further 
clarification. Dahl’s definition of associational autonomy is the right to form relatively 
independent associations or organizations within a civil society, such as political parties or other 
activist groups. Following that, inclusive citizenship requires that no adult subject to a state’s 
laws can be denied the rights that are afforded to all citizens and are necessary to the political 
institutions listed previously. To accomplish these practices, the creation of a legitimate and 
lasting constitution is paramount. Dahl goes on to divide characteristics for a large functional 
democracy between those that are necessary, and those that will further the endeavor of 
democratization, but are not absolutely essential to the creation of the democracy itself.  
Dahl’s characteristics that he claims are necessary for democratization to occur include 
control of the military and police by elected officials, a democratic political culture, and finally 
that there be no strong foreign control hostile to democracy. While the first and third are clearer 
goals to attain, creating a society that views democracy positively and exists in a similar political 
culture implies that the subgroups within civil society all view the democratic government and 
the political institutions that sustain them in an analogous way. Some, like Dahl and Huntington, 
have argued that a fairly homogenous society (Japan, for example) in terms of culture, religion, 
and ethnicity may be necessary for successful democratization, while others, such as Linz, 
Stepan, and Lipset, contend that successful democratization may only require common 
democratic values held by all citizens.  
These criteria lead us to Dahl’s favorable characteristics for democracy: a modern market 
economy and weak sub cultural pluralism within civil society. The latter condition brings us to a 
 
	   9 
key point of debate in the literature on democracy and democratization. Do different cultures 
matter when constructing a democracy? In terms of their citizens’ views on democracy, Dahl 
seems to believe that similar views on democracy are required. He goes on, however, to address 
this question of diverse culture by citing examples (US, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, and 
Canada) in which democracies have succeeded despite their social cleavages. This leads Dahl to 
the conclusion that the success of states with deep social cleavages depends upon the state 
fulfilling the remaining categories associated with democracy, such as a democratic political 
culture, free and fair elections, and sustain freedom of expression, to name a few. Therefore, in 
countries where all other conditions are favorable to democracy, the challenge of having a 
diverse citizenship can be more easily managed.  
Although Dahl skillfully presents a comprehensive list of qualifications for institutional 
practices within a functional democracy, as well as criteria for what is needed or wanted in that 
successful democracy, a critique of his work—including that by Huntington, whom I discuss 
later—is that while he examines democracy, he does not adequately emphasize the importance of 
economic development. In other words, he does not address the concerns of those who argue that 
economic development is absolutely necessary if a state wishes to democratize. When discussing 
the conditions that are favorable for democracy, Dahl does not categorize a modern market 
economy as a necessity to democracy, only as favorable characteristic. In addition to this, when 
advocating for a somewhat homogenous society in terms of culture, political beliefs, and 
attitudes towards democracy, Dahl does not address other differences that occur within society, 
such as income inequality, reinforcing the previous criticism of Dahl’s lack of emphasis on the 
developmental issues for a new democracy.  
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Arend Lijphart, rather than placing social cleavages in a category that will most likely be 
detrimental to democracy, argues that they can be leveraged effectively in a system of 
Consociational Democracy, which unites fractured states for a common political goal.6 As 
opposed to Dahl’s individualized recipe for democracy, Lijphart champions the idea of group 
rights. The central tenets of consociationalism are government by grand coalition—essentially a 
cartel of elites—and segmental autonomy. The grand coalition governs the state as a whole while 
representing the segments of society that are culturally, ethnically, or religiously divided. By 
looking at Northern European states, Lijphart found that a once fractured state, when confronted 
with a common enemy, could unite to create multiple balances of power among the existing 
subcultures. Therefore, consociationalism is born from the relationship between political culture, 
social structure, and political stability.  
Typically, political stability depends on overlapping group membership within a 
society—by this he means that the segments of society we divide ourselves into have some 
fluidity in membership. However, in consociationalism, this is not a requirement. Lijphart 
suggests that when confronted with an external threat, a grand coalition forms to prevent the 
fragmentation of the state into hostile subcultures. With a grand coalition, the cabinet includes 
extra parties so that it can represent the views of a broader portion of the public, and a minority 
veto system to ensure that all groups are represented equally. In a contentious society with 
clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, a grand coalition government 
sidesteps many of the problems that would surface in a majority-rule form of government. He 
concludes that for consociational democracy to succeed, there first must be a government by 
coalition, a second element of segmental authority, a proportional electoral system, and finally a 
                                                
6 Arend Lijphart. “Consociational Democracy” World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jan., 1969), pp. 207-225 
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mutual veto for the protection of minority interests. More than this, the consociational 
democracy must satisfy the following requirements: first, the elites must have the ability to 
accommodate divergent interests of subcultures. Second, the elites must have the ability to 
transcend cleavages. Third, the elites must have a commitment to the maintenance and survival 
of the system, and finally there must be an understanding of the perils of political fragmentation. 
If we recall Dahl’s qualifications for democracy, Lijphart’s set looks quite different. This system 
of government profoundly contrasts with the majority-rule ideal of Dahl’s democracy, and is 
often viewed as controversial because it exists on the basis of deep social cleavages, ranging 
from ideology and religion to ethnicity and language, and prioritizes the treatment of groups as a 
whole over one’s individual equality within society.  
Lijphart, like Dahl, lists for us a series of favorable conditions that correspond with 
consociational democracy. Unlike a traditional democracy, a multiple balance of power and a 
multi-party system among the segments of a plural society are more favorable than a dual 
balance of power, i.e. a two-party system.7 In addition to this, Lijphart’s research suggests that 
smaller countries adapt to consociational democracy more favorably than large countries. For 
example, the largest country he studied was the Netherlands, which had a population of less than 
12 million in 1960. As Haiti’s current population is about 10.3 million people, this characteristic 
bolsters Haiti’s candidacy for consociational democracy. Iraq, however, has a population of 
about 33 million, but possesses a pluralistic, fractured society much closer to the kind that 
Lijphart describes than that of Haiti. Nonetheless, both the internal and external characteristics of 
small countries are beneficial for consociational democracy in different ways: internally, elites 
are more likely to know each other and meet often, whereas externally, small countries are more 
                                                
7 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: a comparative exploration (New Haven: Yale 
Universtity Press, 1977), 55. 
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likely to feel threatened by their neighbors, reinforcing the concept that when presented with an 
external threat, the segments of society will unite to create a grand coalition government. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to assume that group-based consociational democracy can 
flourish anywhere—like individual-based liberal democracy, there are certain conditions that 
appear to be necessary for its success.  
With a nuanced understanding of Lijphart and Dahl’s theories of individual and group-
based democracies, we can now examine Samuel Huntington’s more economically driven 
consideration of democratization in order to broaden our scope of how to best evaluate attempts 
at democracy. In Huntington’s The Third Wave, he explains that if a given country lacks certain 
favorable internal conditions, it is unlikely to democratize, even in the snowballing third wave of 
democracy, which he claims began in the 1970s.8 Relying on Schumpeter’s procedural definition 
of democracy as an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions—i.e. democracy 
cannot exist without political parties and without elections—Huntington outlines various 
obstacles to democracy.9 Huntington believes these obstacles include: virtual absence of 
experience with functional democracy, leaders of authoritarian regimes, absence of commitment 
to democratic values among political leaders, certain non-western cultures that are particularly 
hostile to democracy, lack of economic development, and finally, poverty. While Huntington 
believes that Islam and Confucianism are particularly hostile to democracy, it is important to 
note that Indonesia, which hosts millions of Muslims, maintains a functional democracy, 
pointing to the fact that there is nothing endemic to Islam that is inherently anti-democratic.  
Unlike Dahl, Huntington believes that when it comes to democratization, political 
leadership and economic advancement are the most important indicators of success, as he 
                                                
8 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) 
9 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, Harper and Row: 1942), 
283.  
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believes they are the most critical to a state’s health. The ability to fund institution building is 
necessary if one is to attempt democracy building. He reminds us, however, that even though an 
overall correlation exists between levels of economic development and democracy, no level of 
economic development alone can bring about democratization. Along with the people in the 
state, the political leaders must believe that liberal democracy is the best and only option. This 
departure represents a larger divide between theorists who either believe that democracy or 
development must come first when pursuing democratization. Fareed Zakaria, who will be 
discussed later in this section, feels similarly to Huntington: good governance and equal 
distribution of goods are essential to a functioning democracy.   
Although Huntington believes in the power and importance of elections, as evidenced by 
his “two-turnover test,” he understands that defining democracy in terms of elections alone is 
limiting, and must be balanced with other criteria, such as those Dahl puts forth.10  Unlike the 
previous authors, Huntington cautions us to remember that when evaluating a democracy, the 
stability of the system in question differs from the very nature of the system itself. In other 
words: democracy planners must remember that when exporting democracy, even if every 
criterion we have seen listed was in place, democracy would not flourish unless the government 
in question had stability as well. For Huntington, stability—or the state’s level of 
institutionalization—and its security apparatus go hand in hand. The greater the levels of 
violence within governmental transitions, the harder it is to successfully democratize. Security, 
just like any governmental institution, helps ensure the longevity and stability of the government 
in question.  
                                                
10 In The Third Wave, Huntington posits that the true test of a successful transition to democracy is when 
an incumbent part is voted out office, followed by its successor, without a collapse in the democratic 
constitutional order.  
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While Huntington is concerned with stability, theorists Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, in 
their work The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, are primarily concerned with the legitimacy, 
efficacy, and effectiveness of a government in order to maintain democratic practices.11 Like the 
previous authors discussed, Linz and Stepan have their own criteria in defining democracy, but 
as we have now come to expect, their definition differs slightly from what we have seen before. 
Linz and Stepan argue that a democracy can be defined by the following: legal freedom to 
formulate and advocate political alternatives, freedom of association, speech, and other basic 
freedoms of person, free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of 
those leaders’ claim to rule (elections), inclusion of all effective political offices in the 
democratic process, provision for the participation of all members of society, and the freedom to 
create political parties and conduct free and honest elections. These criteria suggest a balance of 
institutional necessities as well as the more basic values that we associate with ideal democracy. 
Linz and Stepan seem not only to be considering democracy conceptually and all that it entails, 
but also the conditions of the country itself along with its civil society that helps to establish its 
government. Much like the theorists previously discussed, they work to enhance our idealized 
understanding of liberal, individual democracy and the values that it assumes, while 
simultaneously considering its more difficult and pragmatic institutional needs.    
Additionally, Linz and Stepan are also concerned with dissecting how to maintain a 
democracy, rather than just how to create one. They focus on the concept of legitimacy as 
defined by Max Weber: if a political regime is legitimate, it means that its participants have 
certain beliefs or faith in regard to it, which are based on either legal, traditional, or charismatic 
                                                
11	  Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, edited by Linz, Juan J., Alfred 
C. Stepan. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
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authority.12 Accordingly, they find that legitimacy is either granted or withdrawn by each 
member of society, and that only the passing of time, or a charismatic leader can reinforce 
democratic institutions in their stages of infancy. Efficacy is judged as the sum of a 
government’s actions over a long period of time, and is heavily influenced by comparisons to 
other state’s functions. Finally, the effectiveness of the government in question can either work 
to forward the legitimacy of the democracy or it can quickly cause its population to lose faith, 
and thus reduce legitimacy. Linz and Stepan provide a counter-balance to Huntington’s 
assurances that security and stability ensure a democracy’s survival: while it is difficult to define 
and understand what brings about legitimacy, even the most stable and secure state will 
eventually fail without it. Political parties return as a recurring theme for these two as well, 
however they complicate the idea of political parties by suggesting that an opposition party, if it 
works outside the rules and norms of the new democracy, can be a force of destabilization and 
crisis. If we can recall from Huntington and Schumpeter, a representational party system leads to 
the most stable kind of democracy because it allows for organized opposition and healthy change 
that is reflective of the will of the people within the state as whole. However, if subsequent 
parties attempt to overthrow the system and bypass the rules and norms of the democracy, which 
are created by the political institutions put in place, the results will likely be destructive.  
Seymour Martin Lipset, with liberal use of Alexis de Tocqueville and Schattschneider, 
argues passionately for the indispensability of political parties in keeping with his 
democratization colleagues.13 He maintains that the conflict between the governing and 
opposition parties helps to establish democratic norms and rules. Therefore, a stable democracy 
                                                
12	  Max Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (Talcott Parsons (ed.), New York: Free 
Press, 1964), 382.  
13 Seymour M. Lipset “The Indispensability of Political Parties,” Journal of Democracy 11.1 (2000): 48-
55.  
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requires a supportive culture, the rights of the opposition, free speech and assembly, rule of law, 
regular elections, and turnover in elected office. Again, we have this slippery category of 
needing a supportive culture, or similar views on democracy in order to embrace the state’s new 
government. For democracy planners, this perhaps suggests an intimate knowledge of the state’s 
political, social, and historical contexts before any attempts at democratization can be made. It is 
important to note that a stable democracy also requires a flexible time line—one that 
acknowledges the often-lengthy endeavor of institutionalizing democracy. Although none of the 
authors discussed (except Whitehead) mentions the concept of time directly, they all 
acknowledge that effective, legitimate, and stable institutions grow slowly. Lipset is the first of 
the authors discussed to really stress not only the importance of the rule of law, but also the 
necessity of a legitimate opposition party. Without an opposition party, a democracy can quickly 
turn into a dictatorship. The core of democracy thrives on debate—it would follow that on a 
larger scale, the institution could not survive without at least two strong, oppositional parties. 
The two-party system, however, must be supported by the norms and practices of the 
government in question, and viewed with legitimacy by the state’s citizens.  
Furthermore, Lipset pays significant attention to considering democracy from a 
sociological and behavioral standpoint.14 Like Linz and Stepan, Lipset places importance on the 
relationship between legitimacy and the effectiveness of the political system. As there are so 
many differing cases, with so many nuanced and complex historical contexts, he suggests that 
academics cannot simply say that there is one set of social conditions (income, urbanization, and 
education levels) that are regularly associated with any kind of political system. This is why it is 
absolutely critical to examine each country and discern its unique characteristics before 
                                                
14 Seymour M. Lipset “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 53, No. 1 (1959), 69-105.  
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attempting democratization. After cautioning democracy planners not to oversimplify, Lipset 
finds—much like his contemporaries—there are general trends that demonstrate what a 
democracy engenders. Democracies tend to have higher per-capita incomes, a higher degree of 
urbanization, a higher degree of education, and the ability to create voluntary organizations that 
further civil society. Huntington, of the development-first school, would endorse his 
assessments.15 According to Lipset, democracy requires a supportive culture (here, he is in 
agreement with Dahl and others), and newer democracies must be rapidly institutionalized, 
consolidated, and legitimized. To do this, he suggests that a strong civil society is required.  
Here it is necessary to flesh out what civil society means within the context of 
democratization, and to discuss the benefits of its strengths or weakness. To talk about the 
importance of a strong civil society is to talk about Robert Putnam and his work on the 
significance of social capital.16 Comparing northern and southern Italy, Putnam et al survey the 
institutional performance of regional governments and find that in northern Italy, where citizens 
participate actively in sports clubs, literary guilds, and choral societies, the governments are 
more democratic. On the other hand, in southern Italy, where patterns of civil engagement are 
weak, the regional governments tend toward a hierarchy that lacks accountability and no systems 
in place for feedback, which in turn breed corruption and inefficiency. Putnam concludes by 
labeling these networks and norms of reciprocity within civil society as “social capital,” and 
argues that they positively impact functional governance because trust is engendered between the 
people and the state. In short: strong social capital is indicative of a strong civil society and 
institutional performance, which as we know is essential to a functional democracy.  
                                                
15 Among democratization scholars, there is a divide between those who believe a state must achieve 
economic development before it can have a democratic government, and those who believe that 
democracy can be built while the country is simultaneously developing its economy.  
16 Robert Putnam Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press: 1994) 
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So far we have seen that even between such different forms of democracy as posited by 
Dahl and Lijphart, governmental institutions are required to maintain legitimacy and stability, 
and civil society must be allowed to organize independently from the government itself for a 
state to be considered democratic in any sense. Fareed Zakaria, however, suggests that while 
democracy might be flourishing, constitutional liberalism is not.17 Zakaria states that 
constitutional liberalism is not about the procedures and institutions in place for selecting 
government, but rather about the government’s goals and ideals. It encompasses the individual’s 
liberty and autonomy, which rests on tradition and rule of law. Labeling a country democratic 
neither ensures democratic practices, nor does it guarantee liberal constitutionalism. He suggests 
that we need to worry about what happens after elections because democracy as the equivalent of 
good governance loses sight of the defense to an individual’s right to life, property, freedom, 
religion, and speech. As mentioned earlier, Zakaria also believes that economic development 
furthers the likelihood of a young democracy’s success. The United States, however, is so eager 
to legitimize and centralize young democracies above all else, that it has lost sight of liberal 
democracy. For Zakaria, a strong constitutional government is essential for a successful 
transition to democracy. If constitutional liberalism is forgotten, democracy becomes nothing but 
“a quaint exercise in rule-making.”18 Instead of putting forth criteria for successful democracy 
and strategies for democratization, Zakaria chooses to define the problem by taking a closer look 
at what the international community has settled for labeling its so-called democracies. He asserts 
that without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of a democracy in a 
divided society only leads to nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war.  
                                                
17 Fareed Zakaria “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1997) pp. 22-43. 
18 Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” 34. 
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Additionally, when writing in light of the Iraq War, Zakaria discusses the concept of 
militarized democratization as it relates to implementing and exporting democracy abroad, 
essentially positing the idea that versions of militarized democratization will not work for the 
developing world.19 By militarized democratization, he means the military endeavor to invade a 
country, and then democratize it by force, disregarding the will of the people for the assumption 
that the entire world believes democracy to be the best form of government. In the United States’ 
efforts to advance its visions of liberal democracy, free trade, and protection of personal property 
rights around the world, administrations are too quick to call a state democratic and to agree with 
Fukuyama’s claim that the West has won. If a state claims that it has successfully democratized, 
but acts more like a dictatorship or autocracy, the United States should not be labeling it as a 
democracy. Overall, Zakaria has a less positive outlook on the possibilities of democratization 
than his contemporaries. However, he does not rule it out completely—democracy planners 
simply have to be aware that when they are chasing democracy, they must be on the lookout for 
liberal constitutionalism as well. Without it, these transplanted, young “democracies” will be 
democratic in name alone.  
Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment adds to the debate on democratization by 
examining the process of creating a democracy from an aid-driven standpoint.20 He contends that 
while the rhetoric regarding democracy promotion is far more hopeful than its less-consistent 
policy reality, progress has indeed been made (he refers to this as the “learning curve”) and 
therefore the endeavor of supporting burgeoning democracies should not be ignored. Carothers 
considers cases that were mainly monetarily based, as opposed to the addition of military 
intervention seen in Haiti and Iraq, and finds that while democracy cannot be exported like a 
                                                
19 Fareed Zakaria “The Limits of Democracy” Newsweek: January 29, 2007.  
20	  Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1999).  
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commodity, it does not grow from within without outside influence. By this, he means that the 
forces of globalization make it impossible for a transitioning country to avoid outside impact or 
modeling. He also asks his readers to remember that democracy promotion does not require 
perfection from the promoters (i.e. the United States). When critiquing the act of externally 
assisting transitioning countries with monetary aid, he states that the greatest problems involve a 
lack of local ownership over the programs in addition to a lack of flexibility in a too-short time 
frame. He reaffirms other scholars who agree that democracy programs cannot be one-size fits 
all, and suggests that we move beyond institutional modeling, wherein a country attempts to 
reproduce the forms of institutions seen in an already established democracy.  
Finally, Laurence Whitehead contends that democracy is best understood as an open-
ended engagement with flexible parameters and no clear finish line.21 His view on democracy 
and democratization somewhat goes against what this paper has previously discussed, because he 
views democratization not as something that can ever be achieved, but as something that is 
always an ongoing process. So what is there to be done if democracy has no strict rules and no 
clear end point? He suggests that if democratization theory is to be examined at all in light of 
contemporary experience, states must approach transplanting democracies abroad with the notion 
that to insist on a set of standardized outcomes regardless of context would be both historically 
and culturally insensitive. The definition of democracy should remain contestable simply 
because all worthwhile conceptions of this form of government must incorporate in some 
capacity the ability for a legitimate opposition to challenge the governing authority. Are there 
better recipes for success? Whitehead does not provide us with a clear answer. As Whitehead 
focuses more on challenging the act of democratization than any of the previous authors 
                                                
21 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience (Oxford; New York, Oxford University 
Press: 2002).  
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discussed, it is more profitable to consider why he takes issue with the act of transplanting 
democracy than to list and analyze his criteria for democracy. Despite our sophisticated 
understandings of democracy as studied over the years by Dahl and his contemporaries, 
Whitehead asserts that the act of transplanting democracy cannot be achieved unless it is 
considered as an ongoing process with no end point in sight.  
When it comes to the act of democratization, Whitehead firmly believes that the “two 
turnover test” posited by Huntington is not enough to test whether or not a country has fully 
democratized, because it assumes that democratization ends after two successful elections.22 He 
complicates the validity of this test by asking whether or not the United States was democratic 
before it abolished slavery—if we hold it up to liberal constitutional values of democracy such as 
Zakaria champions, and even those of Dahl’s ideal democracy, it most certainly was not. Thus, 
when it comes to democratization, the timeline that democracy planners anticipate is extremely 
important. It is necessary to have a nuanced understanding of democracy because if we use an 
incorrect definition, the act of democratization incorrectly becomes a set of clear, quick, and 
formulated choices that have a rational construction ending in closure in every situation. The 
people around the table making decisions matter, and a charismatic leader can pull a country 
together, but seeking short-term stability as if it was democracy is only going to end in crisis and 
fragmentation. Finally, as Whitehead states, if a contemporary process of democratization is 
correctly identified as long-term and open-ended, then the analyst or democracy planner cannot 






                                                
22 Huntington, Third Wave, p. 267. 
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STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS:  
APPLYING UNDERSTANDINGS OF DEMOCRACY TO HAITI AND IRAQ  
 
 While it is necessary to gain a nuanced understanding of the theoretical literature on 
democracy and democratization in order to accurately evaluate what went wrong in Haiti and 
Iraq, it would be insufficient to discuss these theories without further distilling how they can be 
used to understand real world situations. This section provides an analytical framework to do so. 
Lijphart, while important to understand in the canon of literature on democracy, was largely 
rejected by populations who felt that consociational democracy would exacerbate religious and 
cultural divides. Thus, as the United States was not interested in Lijphart’s consociational 
democracy, its characteristics, intrinsic contexts, and obstacles will not be considered within this 
framework. It is important to remember, however, that there is more than one kind of democracy, 
despite the Clinton and Bush administration’s lack of interest in a power-sharing scheme. When 
synthesizing the theorists that were just discussed, we can illuminate some common themes: all 
except Lijphart have a commitment to liberal, individual democracy. These democracies are 
characterized by free, fair, and frequent elections, basic freedoms and expressions of person, the 
creation of a constitution, an autonomous civil society, and legitimate political parties. Along 
with these characteristics, the theorists—Huntington, Lipset, Dahl, and Zakaria, in particular—
are careful to remind their readers of the obstacles to democracy as well: lack of commitment to 
democratic ideals, insufficient economic development, lack of stability, and an absence of 
experience in democracy, to name a few. Beyond the requirements and obstacles, however, we 
can see a third category come to light: the intrinsic and already existing historical, cultural, 
political, and socioeconomic conditions of a country and how these contexts affect its hopes to 
democratize.  
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As there appears to be more to the study of democratization than simply checking off a 
laundry list of commonly understood characteristics of democracy, this paper extracts from the 
previous theory discussion three categories by which to evaluate and examine the United States’ 
failed democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq. The three categories are as follows: first, the 
Characteristics Associated with Democracy that are dependent on a state’s historical, cultural, 
political, and socioeconomic contexts (I will label these as internal characteristics), second, the 
Universal Characteristics of Democracy independent from a state’s internal traits, and third, the 
Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization that arise, in combination, from a country’s 
existing conditions and from objective qualities that would be harmful to any democracy around 
the world. These analytic categories and their criteria are represented in tables 1.1-1.3, and may 
also be found in Appendix 1 on page 99 for future reference.  
 The first category (Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy) relies on a 
country’s unique historical context. The consideration of each country’s historical, cultural, 
political, and socioeconomic contexts and how each relates to the success or failure of its 
democratization process is by nature less clear-cut than that of democracy’s objectively 
necessary qualities. However, due to the unique nature of every single state in the world, these 
characteristics are perhaps the most important to consider. When it comes to studying the United 
States’ failed democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq, it is critical to examine if and when the 
democracy planners ignored internal conditions in each state, thus negatively impacting the 
democratization process. The distinction between this analytical category and the second 
category (Universal Characteristics of Democracy) is that while this category recognizes that 
each country’s existing historical, cultural, or economic realities can affect differently the 
possibilities for, as well as the obstacles to, democratization that result from these unique traits, 
 
	   24 
the second category relies on the United States’ understanding of democracy as independent 
from how it relates to a specific country. In other words, a country that is declared “democratic” 
would reflect what is universally considered as democratic. That aside, the internal democratic 
characteristics associated with each country’s various contexts are represented in Table 1.1:  
 
TABLE 1.1 
INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY  
 
Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)  
Homogenous society (Dahl)   
Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)  
Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and Stepan)  
Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset) 
Urbanization levels (Lipset) 
Education levels (Lipset 
Economic success (Lipset)  




When considering Table 1.1, we must remember Whitehead’s warning that we cannot insist on 
standardized outcomes when engaging in democratization, as that would be the equivalent to 
ignoring each country’s historical, political, and cultural contexts. These characteristics are not 
something that any state is able to craft and give to another in its efforts to speed along 
democratization. Timelines of democratization are never as speedy as democracy planners would 
hope for, and the length of any planned engagement must take into account the internal 
conditions of the country in consideration.   
The second category (Universal Characteristics of Democracy) was chosen because there 
are agreed upon, common goals and prerequisites satisfying the Western model of liberal 
democracy that we can use to decipher how to construct democracies as well as how to judge 
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what went wrong when they fail. Constructing this category consisted mainly of collecting all of 
the objective characteristics for democracy listed in the previous theory section and refining 
them into a list that can be used to examine Haiti and Iraq. When the United States declares a 
country to be “democratic,” it follows that these are the characteristics a democracy should have. 




UNIVERSAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRACY 
 
Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)  
Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)  
Alternative sources of information (Dahl)  
Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)  
Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)  
Strong political leadership (Huntington)  
Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and Stepan)  
Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)   
Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)  
Legitimate political parties (Lipset)  
Justice and rule of law (Lipset)  




Although some of these features of democracy seen in Table 1.2 have to do mainly with Western 
values of liberal democracy, the majority of them rely upon the strength, legitimacy, and stability 
of lasting democratic institutions. For example, free, fair, and frequent elections can only be 
conducted if the government has created an institution through which people can make their 
voices heard—if there were no systems in place, anarchy or tyranny would likely ensue. 
Alternatively, there can be no lasting and legitimate constitution without the power of rule of law 
to enforce it. While these authors differ in what they consider to be the most important when 
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approaching the construction of democracy, they all agree that the creation and maintenance of 
governmental institutions is the key to a successful transition to democracy, and something that 
is universally desirable when constructing democracies.  
Finally, the third category (Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization) contains 
characteristics that are based in combination on a country’s existing conditions, but also on 
universal characteristics that would be harmful to any democracy around the world. These are 
not as simple as listing the opposites of what we desire in a democracy—they exist separately as 
things that democracy planners must account for, work against, and anticipate. While this list 
incorporates the obstacles taken from the theorists discussed in the previous section, it does not 
contain many of the unique obstacles that the Clinton and Bush administrations faced in Haiti 
and Iraq, as those will be explained with great detail in later sections. The obstacles to 
democracy and democratization as derived from the theorists previously discussed are 




OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)  
Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)  
Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)  
Poverty (Huntington)  
Lack of stability (Huntington)  
Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)   
Viewing the election as the final step in democratization (Zakaria)  
Militarized democratization (Zakaria)  
Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic institutions (Whitehead)  
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As stated in regards to the intrinsic characteristics contained within each state, while these 
obstacles represented in Table 1.3 certainly make it more difficult to democratize, they do not 
make it an impossible endeavor. However, the more obstacles to democracy confronted by those 
who wish to democratize, the less likely it will be for the country in question to successfully 
democratize. Together, these three categories help us to frame and evaluate what went wrong in 
Haiti and Iraq, and what policy makers might learn about the act of exporting democracy around 
the world. The following chapter presents an analysis of the United States’ democratization 








On December 16 1990, the world rejoiced as it watched Haiti peacefully elect its first-
ever democratic president in the nation’s troubled and violent history. Unfortunately, Jean-
Bertrand Aristide’s promises of economic prosperity, peace, and security for the chaotic and 
bankrupt state were never realized. Nine months into his first term as president, Aristide was 
overthrown by a military coup led by Haitian Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras. Despite 
numerous plans, agreements, and embargoes then placed on Haiti to pressure the de-facto 
government, the United States failed to reinstate Aristide without military intervention. Thus, on 
September 15 1994, President Clinton announced the United States’ planned invasion of Haiti in 
order to promote and uphold democracy in our hemisphere. While the Cédras regime was 
eventually removed, the Clinton administration ultimately failed to democratize Haiti due to an 
insufficient time commitment to rebuilding key institutions, a lack of economic development in 
Haiti during and after the intervention, and a misunderstanding of the requirements of a 
successful and stable democracy.  
In order to understand where and when the Clinton administration maneuvered poorly in 
its policy plans, it is important to examine the Haiti case as it relates to the characteristics of 
democracy and democratization provided in the previous section. Accordingly, this section 
proceeds in the following manner: first, it presents and analyzes Haiti’s political, social, and 
economic contexts as they relate to the Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy. 
Second, it examines the United States’ actions during the three years leading up to military 
invasion, analyzing the Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization that the Clinton 
administrated faced in light of the conditions in Haiti. Finally, it provides an analysis of the 
invasion itself and its aftermath, evaluating the state of democracy in Haiti against the Universal 
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Characteristics of Democracy. This case will demonstrate that while the Clinton administration 
constructed opportunities for elections, created programs for reforming the police force, and 
funneled money into structurally adjusting Haiti’s economy, it poorly assessed Haiti’s underlying 
political, economic, and social contexts, fundamentally misunderstood the necessary 
characteristics required for a successful and stable democracy, and effectively abandoned Haiti 
before democracy could truly be realized.  
 
CONDITIONS IN HAITI PRIOR TO INVASION 
 
 If we recall from the previous section, the characteristics associated with the internal 
evolution of democracy within a country, as listed on page 99, provide a structure with which to 
evaluate Haiti’s prospects for democracy. Although none of the Internal Characteristics of 
Democracy alone are the difference between success and failure in the realm of democratization, 
if enough are not met, it becomes all that much more difficult for democracy to develop. As we 
examine the conditions in Haiti prior to Clinton’s invasion, looking at its history as well as its 
social, political, and economic conditions, it is unfortunately true that Haiti lacked nearly all of 
these internal conditions. For example, Dahl tells us that a democratic belief and political culture 
are ideal characteristics for a society to exhibit in order to more successfully develop democracy. 
Additionally, Huntington is quick to remind policy makers of the importance of economic 
success when attempting to restructure government. However, Haiti has neither been successful 
in developing a functioning economy, nor has its dictatorial rule encouraged a supportive 
democratic culture. In examining Haiti’s history with more detail, it is clear that the island nation 
lacked most key characteristics that would have assisted with its democratization.  
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Haiti’s history is one that has been consumed with violence, famine, corruption, and 
poverty. Despite the spotlight placed on the military junta that controlled Haiti from 1991 to 
1994, the junta’s theft of democracy from Aristide was simply the latest in a long string of cruel 
regimes preventing the country from developing economically and progressing politically. 
Gaining its independence in 1804 from the French through a slave-led revolution, Haiti’s destiny 
as the first free black republic should have been prosperous. Haiti, however, had been left in 
literal and economic ruin by the time of its independence.23 The cost of the war bankrupted the 
new state, crippling its chances for successful development. Additionally, Haiti’s main source of 
income relied on subsistence agriculture, and in the face of self-perpetuating poverty and the 
inability to advance their farming techniques, Haitians turned to deforestation in order to create 
and sell charcoal for fuel.24 Unfortunately, this led to erosion of the land available for farming, 
which, to this day, has remained one of the main sources of income for the state, as well as the 
eventual development of a textile industry. In 1990, before the collapse of Aristide’s 
administration, Haiti’s GDP per capita was approximately $360 per year: less than 50 percent of 
its population had access to clean water, its citizens’ life expectancy was 53 years, and 28 
percent of Haitian children younger than five were malnourished.25 Haiti’s economic state defies 
Dahl, Huntington, and Lipset’s ideals for the type of environment necessary for democratization: 
Haiti did not have a successful market economy, let alone a functioning economy of any kind. 
Even before the United States further devastated the Western hemisphere’s poorest state with 
harsh embargoes, Haiti was not positioned well to develop democracy. Again, while economic 
                                                
23 Philippe R. Girard, Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti. (1st ed. New York, N.Y: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), 11 
24 Jorge I. Domînguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the 1990s (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 145. 
25 Yolaine Armand, "Democracy in Haiti: The Legacy of Anti-Democratic Political and Social 
Traditions." International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 2, no. 4 (Summer, 1989): 537-561. 
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success is not the only defining factor in democratic development, it is certainly an important one 
when looking at Haiti’s extreme levels of poverty.   
 Haiti’s political past also informed its democratization prospects. As we can recall, 
according to Lipset, Linz, and Stepan, a supportive democratic culture is absolutely more 
beneficial for the development of democracy than a culture and government that is hostile, 
violent, and dictatorial. In order for a government to make democratic changes, as argued by 
both Linz and Stepan, it ideally needs to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of each member of 
society. Haiti has been haunted by political instability and dictatorial autocracy for decades, 
making it impossible to foster legitimacy or a supportive democratic culture. Its political pattern 
is one that can be characterized by violent coups leading to unstable and frequent changes in 
government. Each new government was again followed by a violent coup when it failed to live 
up to expectations.26 This is illustrated by the fact that between the years 1843 and 1915, Haiti 
experienced 102 revolts, civil wars, and revolutions.27  
Haiti’s history has known very little stability, which contributed to its high levels of 
violence and thus weakened its civil society, which Putnam tells us is critical to securing 
democracy. In examining Haiti’s political past, it is clear that its governments failed to engender 
legitimacy, or create a culture of democratic belief and support. Ideally, the legitimacy of a 
government can be seen in the eyes of its people: it is received in trust from civil society, not 
taken by force and maintained by the military. Instead of crafting lasting institutions to support 
strong governance, Haiti’s governments have relied almost singularly on its armed forces for 
maintaining order and rule of law, until the first, and ultimately ineffective, American occupation 
                                                
26 Ibid, 540. 
27 Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl. Written in Blood :The Story of the Haitian People, 1492- 
1971. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 172. 
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from 1915 to 1934.28 This occupation robbed the Haitians of their dignity and failed to create a 
lasting difference in the government. While the U.S. soldiers assisted in building roads, 
constructing schools, and maintaining a stable environment, they took all agency away from 
Haiti’s government: the United States had total veto power over all governmental and economic 
decisions in Haiti, essentially confiscating its independence for the duration of the occupation.  
In tracing Haiti’s fraught political history, we can now turn to the Duvalier Regime, 
which will provide the political backdrop to Aristide’s brief presidency, including the conditions 
that Aristide inherited when he took office: beginning with François Duvalier (Papa Doc) in 
1957, and ending with his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (Bébé Doc) in1986, these twin regimes 
further damaged Haiti’s democratic prospects with their brutal rule and lack of respect for basic 
human rights. While Papa Doc was initially popular, his rule eventually marked the height of 
cruelty in the Haitian government. The Duvalier regime can be characterized by its political 
terror, economic incompetence and rampant violence with the use of the Tonton Macoutes, 
Duvalier’s private police force, which ensured the regime’s total control of power by instilling 
fear in the urban and rural areas of the country.29 This notorious police force, numbering 
approximately 100,000 at the time the Duvalier regime ended, routinely executed children, raped 
women, and killed without discretion, effectively destroying civil society in Haiti. Many scholars 
blame the effects of the Duvalier regime as the reason why Haiti has been unable to sustain 
democracy, as it removed all forms of opposition to its government, making the democratic 
process impossible when, years later, the time came for elections.30 While it is clear that Haiti’s 
political past cannot be characterized as supportive to democratization, it is important to 
                                                
28 John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy :The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997.  
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 17. 
29 Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 15  
30 Judson Jeffries, "The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention." Caribbean Quarterly 47, 
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remember that these characteristics become more consequential when paired with others that are 
equally as unfavorable to democracy. Thus, Haiti’s limited prior experience with democracy 
cannot be solely blamed for the United States’ inability to install democracy in the island nation.  
 Before turning to consider Aristide’s brief “democracy” and the United States’ actions 
prior to the invasion, it is necessary to bring to light Haiti’s social contexts. Haiti divides itself 
along the lines of race, education, and urbanization. With its history as a French-colonized slave 
state, 90 percent of its population is black (noir) whereas only 10 percent is made up from the 
lighter-skinned mulâtres. Historically, the color of one’s skin highly determined one’s level of 
economic prosperity and education, as Haiti’s mulatto elite often monopolized power.31 
Although homogeneity is not entirely necessary to secure a functional democracy (the United 
States, if we recall, is proof of this), in a state where other factors are stacked against its 
development, it may very well be a detriment.  
Furthermore, Lipset reminds us that urbanization and education levels are important 
when evaluating a state’s proclivity toward democracy. While Haiti is not entirely homogenous, 
as discussed previously, its low levels of education and urbanization are of greater concern when 
considering democratization. Haiti is divided in its language. While the official language in Haiti 
was listed until 1987 as French, the majority of the population speaks Creole, with only 5-10 
percent of the population, the economic and political elite, fluent in French.32 Thus, the language 
of government (French) is inaccessible to the majority of the Haitian population, creating yet 
another barrier to democracy. Moreover, in 1990, the year of Aristide’s election, almost 75 
percent of Haiti’s population of 7 million was functionally illiterate. This systemic lack of 
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available education then hurts the country’s economy and prevents its citizens from being fully 
educated and able to participate politically.  
Another important point of division exists between Haiti’s cities and its rural poor. Only 
10 percent of the country is urbanized, with the rest dedicated to subsistence farming.33 This 
division localizes what little wealth Haiti has to its cities, while the other 90 percent of the 
population lives in extreme poverty in the more rural areas of the island. Thus, Haiti’s 
urbanization and education levels, combined with its racial divisions, make the prospect of 
democracy even more difficult to pursue. Haiti’s economic, political, and social conditions prior 
to the United States’ involvement reveal there was very little that could have been done in order 
to overcome the country’s structural barriers to democracy.  
 Despite criticisms from the CIA, Clinton made clear in the years leading up to the 
invasion that he supported Aristide through numerous rhetorical commitments, promising that 
the United States would “restore democracy and President Aristide [to Haiti] as soon as 
possible,” unequivocally linking Haiti’s return to democracy with Aristide’s return to his 
country.34  It was sharply debated, however, whether Haiti’s president (or his administration) was 
democratic. Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected in December of 1990 with 67.5 percent of 
the vote while representatives from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United 
Nations (UN) sent representatives to ensure a peaceful beginning to Haiti’s transition to 
democracy. As discussed in one of the numerous Congressional Hearings on the matter, many 
believed that the international delegation, which included former President Carter, made a grave 
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mistake in pulling out of Haiti so soon after the election of Aristide.35 While the United Nations 
Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) ensured a peaceful 
election, they did not stay to ensure a peaceful administration, or a functioning democracy. 
Aristide’s popularity, which was garnered from the disadvantaged poor and leveraged by the 
Lavalas movement,36 was indisputable when compared to the U.S.—favored candidate in 1990 
Marc Bazin, a pro-American representative from the IMF with little support from the people.37 A 
Populist at heart, Aristide promised the Haitian poor that they would no longer be terrorized by 
the Tonton Macoutes or forgotten by the government. However, when elected to a bankrupt 
government with no judicial system, and little infrastructure to speak of, his promises were 
difficult to keep.  
As discussed previously, Haiti’s biggest hurdles to overcome in its pursuit of democracy 
were its lack of security, justice, education, and economic development.38 Once in office, 
Aristide attempted to tackle these weaknesses, but in doing so he alienated the people within his 
government from whom he needed support. For example: in his first month in office, Aristide 
fired all of the army’s senior officers, engendering bitter and hostile feelings within the only 
operational arm of the state.39 This maneuver angered the already violent and coup-prone army, 
and was ultimately the nail in Aristide’s own coffin: members of the disenfranchised army 
organized the coup that forced him to flee the country. Aristide also lost support in parliament 
when he refused to accept the nomination of any member of the Front National pour le 
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Changement et la Démocratie (FNCD), the political party that helped elect him.40 Finally, 
Aristide promoted violent and undemocratic behavior from his supporters, encouraging 
necklacing41 against Duvalier supporters when there was no police force to monitor the streets, 
even going so far as to enthusiastically tell his people to “give [them] what [they] deserve” as 
people were burning to death.42 Aristide encouraged violence with his words, and this violence 
that impeded Haiti’s security was ultimately detrimental to the development of democracy, 
which requires legal opposition parties and civil society organizations that can voice their 
opinions within a secure environment.  
Despite Clinton’s willing partnership with Aristide, the fiery nationalist was not 
universally seen as the best choice for U.S. security interests. Two days after Aristide told his 
citizens to continue murdering people in the streets, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras led the 
military coup that brought Aristide’s administration to a shuddering halt. It seems clear that 
Aristide would not bring Haiti democracy. Yet the Clinton administration, despite opposition 
from Congress (with the exception of the Black Caucus), the CIA, and U.S. popular opinion, 
rallied behind Aristide and promised that returning him to his government would ensure 
democracy.43 With the choice between Cédras and Aristide, Clinton chose the latter and in doing 
so, unquestioningly linked Aristide with Haiti’s democratization prospects. Yes, a democratic 
election brought Haitians a new president in 1990, but Haiti itself still lacked security, justice, 
education, and a functioning economy. As we have seen, democracy cannot be solely defined by 
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an election. Haiti faced insurmountable structural obstacles to democracy that a charismatic 
president could not overcome alone. Despite the fact that Clinton’s mission in Haiti was named  
“Operation Uphold Democracy,” it is clear that for democratization to take hold in Haiti, the 
country would need much more than its former leader returned home.44 
 
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS HAITI: 1991—1994  
In the three years between Cédras’ coup and the United States’ invasion (September 
1991—September 1994), Presidents Bush and Clinton faced numerous obstacles to the 
democratization of Haiti. These obstacles resulted in part from domestic issues that arose while 
the administrations were attempting a diplomatic solution to the crisis, as well as from a 
misunderstanding of the situation on the ground in Haiti and a failure to consider aspects of 
democracy unrelated to elections. This section will analyze the Obstacles to Democracy and 
Democratization with the structure and characteristics identified in the previous chapter as 
applied to Haiti As we will see, the economic embargoes placed on Haiti in an effort to draw 
Cédras out of a stalemate only increased levels of poverty, further divided society along lines of 
wealth and access, created more violence in the streets, and generally decreased the levels of 
stability in the state as a whole—all considered detrimental obstacles in the pursuit of democracy 
by our scholars on the subject. Additionally, the Clinton administration underestimated the 
leaders of the authoritarian regime in negotiations, which harmed the Haitian people. Finally, 
when the time came to plan how democracy would unfold in Haiti, the growing refugee problem 
and its domestic impact compelled Clinton to design a mission that was insufficient in time and 
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scope, viewing the election as the final step in democratization, in contrast to both Zakaria and 
Whitehead, who argue that conducting an election is but one step in a larger process. 
Before analyzing the domestic obstacles to Clinton’s “Operation Uphold Democracy,” it 
is necessary to examine more closely Clinton’s motivation for getting involved in the first place. 
There are several possibilities that have come to light. First, the United States seeks to 
universally support democracy and prevent human rights violations, which it finds “intolerable 
everywhere, but are unconscionable on our doorstep.”45 Second, Haiti is in the American sphere 
of influence, and pertinent to US foreign policy, as established by Clinton’s most famous foreign 
policy endeavor of “Engagement and Enlargement” in which he demonstrates a “firm 
commitment to expanding the global realm of democracy.”46 Third, as we will discuss, the 
Haitian refugee problem was getting out of control: by the spring of 1994, the refugees held at 
Guantanamo had already cost the U.S. government $200 million and the U.S. Coast Guard had 
already turned away tens of thousands of displaced Haitians.47 Fourth, the United States had 
suffered continual humiliation from Cédras’ junta since the inception of the coup, in addition to 
the international embarrassment the Clinton administration had been feeling due to its failures in 
Bosnia and Rwanda. Finally, ensuring the success of democracy in Haiti benefits US interests, 
such as free markets, economic opportunity, and national security, because as President Clinton 
frequently noted, “democracies don’t attack each other.”48 Due to these overlapping incentives, it 
is important to examine the President’s policy choices regarding Haiti as well as the domestic 
pressures weighing on Clinton during the three years that the Cédras coup held Haiti hostage. As 
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we will see, the competing interests of the Clinton administration were ultimately harmful to 
Operation Uphold Democracy. 
When faced with the collapse of Aristide’s government, the United States crippled Haiti 
with three years of ineffectual embargoes as it attempted to unseat the Cédras regime that had 
taken hold in the island nation. Days after the coup had unseated Aristide, President George 
Bush initiated Executive Order 12775, prohibiting Haitian access to US assets and all transfers of 
money to Haiti.49 This was followed by Executive Order No. 12779 of October 28, 1991, and to 
the same end President Clinton followed suit with Executive Orders No. 12853 of June 30, 1993, 
No. 12872 of October 18, 1993, No. 12914 of May 7, 1994, No. 12917 of May 21, 1994, No. 
12920 of June 10, 1994, and No. 12922 of June 21, 1994.50 As each embargo failed to bring the 
Cédras regime to the negotiating table, the sanctions increased in severity throughout the three 
years Cédras was in power, limiting oil, arms, and eventually all trade to Haiti. While economic 
sanctions can prove very effective when sending a message to another country, the United States 
failed to make an impact on the military junta as the sanctions were felt not by the junta, but by 
the already starving Haitian poor. Additionally, not all of Haiti’s trading partners followed the 
U.S. embargoes, until UN and OAS involvement in June of 1993 with UNSC Resolution 841, 
which placed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.  
Instead of helping democracy return to Haiti, the United States’ push for economic 
sanctions only damaged the state’s infrastructure, increased levels of violence, sickness, and 
famine, and unquestionably worsened the humanitarian crisis in the country. As the United 
States supplied between 60 to 65 percent of Haiti’s imports, as well as received approximately 85 
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percent of the country’s exports, both President Bush and President Clinton with the support of 
Congress, expected the embargoes to have a crippling effect.51 Unfortunately, the embargoes did 
indeed cripple Haiti, but it did not seem to touch the military junta as was planned. While the 
United States maintained that its mission was to “peacefully, but very forcefully help Haiti’s 
legitimately elected president and Haiti’s democratic leaders reverse this coup,” the embargoes, 
which acted as a “sledgehammer” against the Haitian poor, made it impossible to carve out 
humanitarian exceptions.52 Despite President Bush’s guarantee that “our actions are directed at 
those in Haiti who are opposing a return to democracy, not the Haitian poor,” the poor were 
exactly the segment of the population to first and foremost feel the effects of the sanctions.53  
 In order to illustrate the magnitude of the economic sanctions on the majority of Haitians, 
we must examine the relevant statistics before and after the military coup. During Aristide’s 
presidency, only 50 percent of the labor force was employed, one third of the population lacked 
access to modern health services, and 20 percent of Haitian children did not have access to 
education.54 While it is generally agreed upon that embargoes should be conducted in a way that 
prevents unnecessary suffering, the economic impact was felt most severely by the rural poor, 
women, and unskilled factory workers, rather than the well-off military junta. Between 1991 and 
1994, Haiti lost 30,000 jobs, the number of workers employed in the assembly industry sector 
declined from 44,000 to 8,000, and the per capita income decreased by 30 percent to $250 per 
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year.55 Regarding education, nutrition, and basic human rights, the embargoes were equally 
damaging. UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) estimated that during the years of the 
coup, the number of children in the street doubled to 4,000 and the gross school enrollment fell 
from 83 percent to 57 percent in 1994. The number of malnourished children also increased from 
one in five to one in four, as the humanitarian aid designated by the United States was unable to 
reach the rural poor due to gas shortages and inaccessibility of roads.56 The embargoes remain 
incredibly relevant to the democratization efforts in Haiti because, as the poorest nation in the 
hemisphere, even testimony in U.S. Congress noted that “without economic growth, there shall 
be no democracy in Haiti… it is absolutely vital.”57 While economic development is not 
absolutely necessary for every burgeoning democracy—for example, in India at its time of 
independence, 85 percent of the population was rural58—Haiti’s condition as the poorest state in 
the Western hemisphere made it particularly susceptible to any type of sanction.  
The embargoes worsened conditions in Haiti so much so that they further divided society, 
increased poverty and violence levels, and decreased stability, conditions that theorists such as 
Dahl and Huntington argue are obstacles to democracy. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton 
administrations anticipated the destabilizing effects of poverty and resulting violence within the 
state when constructing the economic sanctions, and was therefore embarrassed over the course 
of three years by a small, but very resilient military coup. Both Clinton and Bush underestimated 
the power and adaptability of the authoritarian de facto government, leading the people of Haiti 
                                                
55 Ibid, 2.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Haiti: The Agreement of Governor’s Island and Its Implementation: Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 103rd 
Cong., 9 (1993) (Statement of Clay Shaw, a representative in Congress from the state of Florida). 
58Jyotirindra Das Gupta. “India: Democratic Becoming and Combined Development” Politics in 
Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, 
and Seymour Martin Lipset. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 246.  
 
	   42 
to question the United States’ commitment to Haiti.59  In short: due to lack of consideration for 
the social, political, and economic conditions on the ground in Haiti, the U.S.—instituted 
embargoes seriously inhibited the growth of democracy in the island nation.  
One of the key domestic pressure points that called for U.S. action in Haiti, and one that 
Clinton faced in his first term, was the growing Haitian refugee crisis. During his campaign, 
Clinton had promised to reverse President Bush’s policy of returning the Haitian “Boat People” 
unjustly back to their broken country, but once in office, he maintained the limitations and 
claimed that the refugees were economic in nature, rather than political. The state of Florida had 
already initiated a $1 billion dollar lawsuit against the federal government for spending on illegal 
immigrants over the years.60 Clinton could not afford to alienate Florida, or its congressional 
representatives, as it was a key swing state in national elections. However, this restrictive 
immigration policy was extremely controversial: The Congressional Black Caucus, led by 
Congressman Charles B. Rangel, accused the Clinton administration of a racist immigration 
policy towards the Haitians, asking in regard to what makes the Haiti refugee policy different 
during a Congressional hearing, “is it the color?”61 The administration faced additional criticism 
from Human Rights Watch for its refugee policy because the coup had internally displaced 
300,000 Haitians, 42,000 of which had attempted over the course of three years to escape to the 
United States.62 Although the Clinton administration ultimately softened its immigration policy, 
the United States was still looking at a growing humanitarian crisis in its backyard, ineffectual 
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embargoes, and a promise to “restore democracy in Haiti and restore President Aristide as the 
elected leader of that country” that was beginning to ring false.63 Facing pressure form the Black 
Caucus, Florida, and the international community, Clinton had nowhere to go except Haiti. Thus, 
while the Clinton doctrine reaffirms the United States’ commitment to democracy around the 
world, it seems evident that Clinton’s decision to ultimately invade Haiti was also a product of 
his domestic political calculations.   
When considering his options with how to proceed in Haiti, Clinton utilized the UN in 
conjunction with the OAS to assist in returning Aristide to Haiti. This was Clinton’s way of 
ensuring a limited US time commitment in Haiti, as well as a demonstration of his previously 
stated commitment to multilateralism over unilateral action by a superpower. However, as we 
know from Whitehead, an insufficient time commitment in any democratization effort does not 
often lead to a stable and successful democracy. In light of the military coup that forced Aristide 
to flee the country, and given that Cédras’ thugs were “executing orphaned children, raping 
young girls, killing priests, mutilating people and leaving body parts in the open to terrify 
others,”64 the UN and OAS appointed Dante Caputo, the former minister for foreign affairs of 
Argentina, as the special envoy to Haiti in January of 1993. He was charged with the 
responsibility of diplomatically restoring democracy to Haiti. His mission was known as 
MICIVIH, or “International Civilian Mission in Haiti,” and its top three objectives were to return 
Aristide to Haiti, appoint a Prime Minister, and resolve the question of amnesty for Cédras and 
his thugs.65 Caputo worked closely with U.S. special envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, but 
their efforts were unsuccessful as Cédras was unwilling to negotiate. Thus, on June 16 1993, the 
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UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 841, imposing new oil and arms 
embargoes against Haiti.66  There is no doubt that this action lead to the Governor’s Island 
Agreement on July 3 1993 that promised to restore Aristide peacefully, but unfortunately the 
agreement did not come to fruition when the United States and the UN again underestimated the 
tenacity of the Cédras regime: when it came time to re-instate Aristide, in October of 1993, 
Cédras refused to cooperate, and the agreement was nullified.  
Despite the initial failure of the agreement, it is important look at it closely as it remained 
the indispensable plan of action for the US, UN, and OAS when the time came to invade Haiti in 
September of 1994 during “Operation Uphold Democracy.” The plan contained several concrete 
steps: first, President Aristide would appoint a new commander in chief to replace Cédras, who 
would be granted amnesty along with the rest of the de facto government. Following his 
reinstatement in Haiti, President Aristide would appoint a Prime Minister, to be confirmed by the 
newly reconstituted Parliament. Finally, after these measures were observed, all U.S., UN and 
OAS sanctions were to be suspended. At this time, the agreement specified that monetary foreign 
assistance would help with job creation, social development, and most importantly, the 
installation and training of a new police force that was made separate from the army. All of this 
was expected to take approximately 3-5 years in total.67 Additionally, the mandate would call for 
elections to be held for municipal and Parliamentary seats, as well as for presidential elections at 
the end of Aristide’s term. One year later, in September of 1994, these steps remained the agreed 
upon course of action for the invasion of Haiti, with an important exception: the use of military 
force to implement them.  
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The Governor’s Island Agreement was an important moment of diplomacy for Aristide, 
Cédras, and the United States, but the initial agreement ultimately failed for several reasons: it 
had an insufficient time commitment to the growth of democratic institutions, it viewed 
conducting elections as the final step in the plan, and the sign of a finished success, and its 
misdirected international funding made Haiti subject to the kind of neo-liberal economic 
practices characterized by IMF structural adjustment programs that had already made other 
governments around the world unpopular. Although the agreement promised foreign assistance 
in job creation and social development programs, the aid package would be based on compliance 
with undercutting, neo-liberal modifications and defunding of government programs such as 
public education, healthcare, and support for businesses.68 These known obstacles to democracy 
inhibited a democratic government from successfully developing in Haiti. Despite apprehension 
expressed in Congressional hearings that the largest humanitarian concern in Haiti was the 
complete decimation of its civil society, or its lack of economic growth, or even the 
responsibility to “help rebuilt Haiti… not simply engraft the government and walk away,”69 the 
governor’s island negotiations, which molded the eventual invasion and Operation Uphold 
Democracy, failed to account for Haiti’s lack of democratic experience, poverty, instability, and 
the staying power of the Cédras regime. While these concerns were brought to light, Clinton 
chose to ultimately ignore the apprehension of the legislative branch and maneuver through the 
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THE INVASION AND ITS AFTERMATH:  EVALUATING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI   
 
This final section of the Haiti case evaluates Operation Uphold Democracy and its 
aftermath, using the Universal Characteristics of Democracy to provide insight into whether or 
not the “remarkable coalition” truly “restored democracy to Haiti,” as President Clinton had 
claimed.70 While the Governor’s Island agreement and the following UN involvement in 
Operation Uphold Democracy allowed for the restoration of President Aristide, the appointment 
of a Prime Minister, and free, fair, and frequent elections, other crucial aspects of democracy 
were missing, thus weakening the democratization efforts. Haiti’s lack of security or control of 
force inhibited civil society’s sustained freedom of expression, its ability to participate 
politically—all characteristics deemed necessary for democracy by Dahl, Huntington, Linz and 
Stepan, and Lipset. The absence of a functioning justice system made rule of law close to 
impossible, as well as undermining the strength of Haiti’s Constitution. Finally, Haiti’s dire 
economic situation and budget restrictions mandated by the IMF prevented the development of 
infrastructure that the island nation desperately needed to function democratically and 
economically. Therefore, while the trappings of democracy were constructed in Haiti due to the 
scheduled elections, it is clear that unfortunately, the majority of the Universal Characteristics of 
Democracy, as defined by our scholars of democratization, were not met. As we will see, the 
Clinton administration, in conjunction with the UN, failed to provide sufficient time to develop 
the key democratic institutions and characteristics, thus dooming Haiti to instability and chaos.  
On September 15 1994, President Clinton announced to the world that the United States 
would be “leading the international effort to restore democratic government in Haiti” in a 
military operation that would be “limited and specific,” utilizing an overwhelming 20,000 troops 
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in an effort to minimize casualties on both sides with a time commitment guaranteeing 
Americans soldiers a return home no later than March of the following year.71 Previously, on 
July 31 1994, the UN Security Council Resolution 940 had granted President Clinton the right to 
invade Haiti due to the Cédras regime’s obscene human rights violations and the Haitian 
people’s right to the democracy they had previously chosen. During the speech, Clinton appealed 
directly to America’s idealistic values of upholding democracy, protecting human rights, and 
securing borders. As both Congress and the majority of the population were opposed to any 
military engagement in Haiti, Clinton used explicit language to describe the violent situation on 
the ground, quoting a Haitian child who once told a visitor “I do not care if the police kill me 
because it only brings an end to my suffering” and positioning the US not as “the world’s 
police,” but as a country that has a “responsibility to act” when democracy is denied to a nation 
in our “backyard.”72 This mission would redeem Clinton from his previous international failures, 
and prove to the rest of the world that the United States would not shy away from its 
commitments, even if it took three years to fulfill its promises.  
Ahead of the military forces, President Clinton sent former President Carter, General 
Colin Powell, and Senator Samuel Nunn to attempt diplomatic negotiation with Cédras one final 
time in light of the promised military engagement. The negotiations, which proceeded up until 
the U.S. military was landing in Port-au-Prince, were miraculously successful, but did not 
ultimately remove the occupation presence from the island.73 The diplomatic coalition, backed 
by the pressure of the U.S. military, reached an agreement that allowed the military leaders of 
Haiti to leave with amnesty, so long as the remaining provisions of the Governor’s Island 
Agreement, as discussed previously, could be carried out. The US forces, instead of facing an 
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active engagement, would act as a peaceful occupation force as part of a UN coalition (15,000 
member multinational force as specified by UN Security Council Resolution 940) to guarantee 
that the dictators carried out the terms of the agreement.74 This large force would be scaled down 
incrementally as Haiti built its own democracy that was independent from the MNF 
(multinational force). With the UN involvement, Clinton could keep his promise of limited U.S. 
participation in restoring democracy to Haiti without committing to a long military engagement. 
He also promised the American people that their troops would come home as soon as elections 
were held in the spring of 1995.75 However, as we will see in the numerous UN Security Council 
reports on the status of Haiti’s transition, this would prove to be an insufficient period of time in 
which democracy could be rebuilt in Haiti. 
The invasion itself was brief, and by the Governor’s Island Agreement’s definitions 
successful: by October 15 1994, the military junta had been disbanded; Aristide had been 
reinstated, and had named Smarck Michel as his new Prime Minister. The new government, with 
its newly reinstated Parliament, took office on November 8 1994.76 The next steps would be to 
create and train a new police force, restructure the army, hold elections, and utilize international 
monetary aid to boost Haiti’s economy. Correspondingly, legislative elections were scheduled 
for June and September of 1995, with Presidential elections to follow in December of that same 
year. In the words of President Clinton, the invasion was only ever designed to “provide a secure 
environment for the restoration of President Aristide and democracy, to begin the work of 
retraining the police and the military in a professional manner, and to facilitate a quick handoff 
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to the United Nations mission so that the work of restoring democracy can be continued, the 
developmental aid can begin to flow, Haiti can be rebuilt, and in 1995 another free and fair 
election for President can be held.”77 Unfortunately, none of these steps were successful long-
term. Clinton viewed elections as the final step in democratization, but as we know, elections do 
not ensure an inclusive and educated citizenship, nor do they guarantee political legitimacy and 
stability of government, characteristics all deemed necessary for successful democratization. In 
short, the invasion planned for the trappings of democracy and little else. It is in the aftermath of 
the invasion—in the time of building, peacekeeping, and restructuring—that the Clinton 
administration’s mistakes in transplanting democracy to Haiti become clear.  
After the invasion, the rapid dismissal of the Haitian military caused the creation of the 
police force to begin in a chaotic, haphazard manner. Despite its violent crimes against the 
Haitian people, the army was really the only functioning body in the state, and its quick 
dissolution caused problems for the US forces in Haiti. As the invasion agreement required a 
functioning police force and restructuring of the army, the MNF were asked to train former 
members of the oppressive force into defenders of human rights in a short period of time.78 
According to a Security Council report submitted in January of 1995, it was observed that “the 
collapse of the FADH and the dissolution of the corps of section chiefs have created a security 
void that has contributed to a marked increase in banditry and criminality throughout the 
country,” causing a large portion of the population to be “afraid to meet or demonstrate,” thus 
decreasing personal freedoms and political participation.79 Members of the permanent national 
police, known as the Haitian National Police (HNP) did not begin training until February 1995, 
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with training lasting around four months in order to get the HNP functioning independently as 
soon as possible.80 However, this fast turnaround affected the HNP for years to come, exhibiting 
another example of insufficient time commitment to the Haitian democracy project. Even a year 
after the creation of the police force, the most serious concern for the HNP was the “absence of 
competent senior officers and overall leadership,” a direct result of insufficient training.81 Instead 
of the control of force creating legitimacy and stability for Haiti and its government, the 
ineffectiveness of the HNP and its “lack of qualified staff, adequate premises, and equipment”82 
only destabilized the country. The new police force was essentially unable to ensure security and 
reduce violence in Haiti, resulting in a lack of basic freedoms of person and damaging civil 
society as a whole, all in all weakening Haiti’s new “democratic” government.  
Furthermore, Haiti lacked a functioning justice system and strong rule of law; important 
characteristics that have been argued to be absolutely necessary for a functioning democracy. 
Despite Aristide’s insistence in creating programs to restructure the judicial system in Haiti, 
Operation Uphold Democracy did not allocate sufficient resources or time to the forces of justice 
in the country.83 Without a functioning justice system, there can be no democracy. The 
agreement to give the Cédras regime amnesty only contributed to “rising frustration at the 
inability of the justice system to address past human rights violations and current criminality.”84 
This was especially upsetting as it was estimated that during his regime 4,000 people were killed, 
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300,000 were internally displaced, and more than 60,000 took to the sea on rafts.85 Additionally, 
the courts suffered from a long-standing lack of supporting infrastructure, such as inadequate 
prison systems and courthouses that were on stand-by for rehabilitation.86 These factors 
contributed to weakening Aristide’s legitimacy, and thus the legitimacy of Haiti’s burgeoning 
democracy. More than two years after the invasion, in March of 1997, the situation with regard 
to the judiciary system “remained critical,” revealing an absolute lack of progress in the 
development of the necessary infrastructure.87 Any security or protection of human rights 
enjoyed by the Haitians as a consequence of the invasion remained incredibly fragile. However 
successful from a military standpoint, Operation Uphold Democracy failed to deliver its 
promises. As we have seen, without basic freedoms of person, rule of law, and the protection of a 
functioning judicial system, successful democracy cannot be realized.  
The humanitarian and developmental concerns in Haiti, despite the United States’ 
declarations that Haiti had achieved democracy, were just as pertinent as its problems with 
security and judicial reform, and equally as detrimental to the creation of a lasting and legitimate 
government. As established previously, the lack of economic development in Haiti largely 
contributed to its previous inability to develop democracy, thus its economic state in wake of the 
invasion must be examined. Despite the economic sanctions being lifted in light of Aristide’s 
return, Haiti’s slow economic recovery continued to cripple its people, further limiting the 
growth of democracy in the state. For example, before the embargoes, the number of people 
employed in the assembly sector was estimated at 65,000 people, and neared zero in 1994. 
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However, by 1997, this number had only rebounded to 18,000.88 Additionally, the financial 
commitment of international allies to Haiti’s democratic development and its corresponding neo-
liberal economic agenda did not do much to alleviate the rampant poverty that remained in the 
state for years to come, as noted in a UN Security Council report in June of 1996, which 
observed a “growing demand for social services and infrastructure, such as medical and 
educational facilities, roads, electricity, and improved living conditions.”89 In the years after the 
invasion, and still to this day, Haiti’s economic situation can be characterized by low growth, 
high unemployment, and an impoverished population. By March of 1997, the decreasing 
international commitment to support only served to further the violence and unrest that were 
fuelled by “persistent high levels of unemployment, a rising cost of living, impatience at the slow 
pace of change, and the attempts made by certain sectors to profit politically from growing 
popular frustrations and discontent.”90 Without the proper support for police and judicial 
institutional projects, crimes against humanity grew while the Haitian economy remained 
stagnant. The economy simply could not support the efforts to sustain a democratic government.  
Although the 1995 elections in Haiti acted as the most important piece in the Clinton 
administration’s plans for democratizing the island nation, they were carried out in a way that 
limited citizenship association and informed participation, both necessary for a successful and 
functional government. In the municipal and legislative elections that were held in the summer of 
1995, a million electoral cards went missing, the Provisional Electoral Council confirmed the 
existence of fraud in the voter registration process, and because the elections were hastily put in 
place before the citizens could be properly educated about their new government, there was a 
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low voter turnout of less than 20 percent.91 Thus, a scheduled election does not necessarily 
guarantee democratic conduct or participation. Additionally, in the following Presidential 
election in December 1995, President Préval received an even lower voter turnout of only 15 
percent. This was because the election occurred when Aristide was at peak popularity in Haiti. 
The low turnout reflected the Haitian people’s aversion to electing a new president (despite 
Haiti’s constitutionally mandated five-year presidential terms) when they believed Aristide 
should be able to serve an additional three years in office to account for the amount of time the 
Cédras regime had taken from him.92 Although a UN report claimed “the electoral process, 
which culminated with the election of President Préval on December 17 1995, has provided Haiti 
with newly elected democratic institutions,” it seems clear that labeling Haiti a true democracy 
was for the benefit of Clinton’s foreign policy legacy.93 Préval was a choice that did not 
represent any political change, as he was also from Aristide’s Lavalas party, but significantly 
less popular than his counterpart. Focusing on the surface indications of democracy, the election 
of Aristide and subsequent transition of power to President Préval in 1996 signified to the 
Clinton administration, and the larger community, that democracy had arrived in the island 
nation. According to a popular news source in Haiti, however, democracy was “on course 
without the people.”94 Democracy requires much more than two elections. Operation Uphold 
Democracy failed to support the aspects of a democratic government that extended beyond an 
elected President and Parliament.  
When the final agreed-upon round of municipal and Parliamentary elections was held in 
the spring of 1997, less than 10 percent of the electorate voted. To make matters worse, President 
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Préval’s Prime Minister, Rosny Smarth, faced widespread criticism due to his neo-liberal 
economic policies, and resigned on June 9 1997, leaving Haiti without a functioning Parliament 
fort the next two years. Upon Smarth’s departure however, due to promises of a limited time 
commitment in Haiti, the UN mandate and all US involvement in the country had ceased.95 The 
United States had abandoned Haiti without ensuring sustained freedoms of expression and 
person, civil society’s ability to participate politically, control of force, strong political 
leadership, security, legitimacy, and stability, or rule of law. All this, while fully acknowledging 
that, “the political crisis continues unresolved.”96 Finally, in January of 1999, five years after 
Clinton had declared democracy in Haiti, President Préval dissolved Parliament and appointed 
his own Prime Minister, effectively running the country by dictatorial decree.97 Clearly, 
democracy had ceased to function in Haiti, along with its Constitution. Without a lasting and 
legitimate constitution, there can be no democracy.  
Operation Uphold Democracy did not succeed. Despite efforts to conduct elections, 
create a police force, and restructure the economy, it is evident that, due to a misunderstanding of 
the requirements of democracy and its necessary institutions, an insufficient time commitment, 
and a failure to acknowledge the existing structural obstacles to democracy in the island nation, 
the United States failed to successfully democratize Haiti. As we shall see in the next chapter, ten 
years later, George W. Bush and his neoliberal, neoconservative administration neglected these 
past lessons during the Iraq War and subsequent democratization efforts, ultimately leaving the 
country in worse condition than when the United States invaded.  
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III. IRAQ  
 
 
On 29 January 2002, President George W. Bush coined the term “axis of evil” in his State 
of the Union Address, an excerpt of which is reproduced below:  
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi 
regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a 
decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own 
citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime 
that agreed to international inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime 
that has something to hide from the civilized world. 
 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the 
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave 
and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means 
to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United 
States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. 
 
We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the 
materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. 
 
We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies 
from sudden attack. 
 
And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's 
security.98  
 
A little over a year later, in March of 2003, the Bush administration invaded Iraq on the basis of 
protecting the United States from Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), 
preemptively guarding against the state’s connection to the terrorist group Al Qaeda, and for the 
promotion of democracy in the Middle East. When it became clear that there were no WMDs to 
be found, and no evidence of the Iraq’s connection to Al Qaeda, the only remaining justification 
for the Iraq War was the claim that the United States could bring democracy to Iraq and liberate 
its people from years of brutal, autocratic rule. Unfortunately, due to an inadequate 
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understanding of political, economic, and social contexts in Iraq, a misguided implementation 
strategy, and a total failure to sufficiently support the hastily constructed democratic institutions 
in the state, the United States again failed to successfully democratize a foreign country.   
 The analysis of the Iraq case will continue in a similar manner to that of the Haiti case, 
focusing primarily on the United States’ democratization efforts in Iraq as opposed to its war 
efforts and strategy from 2003-2011. Thus, the sections comprising this chapter will proceed 
guided by the structure laid out in chapter one according to our democracy scholars. First, I will 
present and analyze Iraq’s political, social, and economic conditions prior to invasion as they 
relate to the Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy. Second, I will examine the 
United States’ actions in the years leading up to the invasion, the invasion itself, and the 
involvement of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), analyzing the Obstacles to 
Democracy that the Bush administration both created and faced in light of the conditions in Iraq. 
Finally, I will provide an analysis of the invasion and CPA’s aftermath, evaluating Iraq’s 
fledgling “democracy” against the Universal Characteristics of Democracy previously identified 
by our democratization scholars. This case will demonstrate that while the Bush administration 
removed Saddam Hussein from Iraq, created a new Constitution, and constructed opportunities 
for democratic elections, the administration’s ineffectual knowledge of Iraq’s historical context 
coupled with the United States’ military destruction of the existing institutions only lead to an 
unstable, illegitimate, and ultimately unsuccessful new government.  
 
 
CONDITIONS IN IRAQ PRIOR TO INVASION  
 
 By examining Iraq’s history from its artificial and external inception in 1920 after the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire, it can be seen that unfortunately, due to its harsh autocratic rule and 
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politicized sectarian conflict, the state did not possess many of the Internal Characteristics 
Associated with Democracy before the United States’ attempts at democratization. Politically, 
Iraq has not been successful in developing a democratic culture, nor had its autocratic 
governments inspired trust and legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Socially, Iraq is divided 
along ethno-religious lines, making it nearly impossible for civil society organizations that foster 
democracy to bridge sectarian divides. It is a country with a heterogeneous society, which 
scholars such as Dahl and Huntington argue impedes the development of democracy. 
Economically, while Iraq was eventually able to develop a functioning market economy due to 
its vast oil resources, the sanctions placed upon it following the Gulf War in 1991 created 
irreparable damage to the state’s institutions and its ability to provide basic human necessities to 
its people. If we recall, both Huntington and Lipset contend that a state’s economic levels are 
consequential in its development of democracy. As we have seen, the more internal 
characteristics associated with democracy a state lacks (democratic political culture, vibrant civil 
society, and a stable economy, for example) the more difficult it will be for the state in question 
to develop democracy. Iraq is no exception to this long-standing pattern.  
 Iraq is an artificially constructed state, and like Haiti, its political past can be 
characterized as mostly autocratic, oppressive, and violent. The British, following the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire, drew its borders arbitrarily in 1920. With the creation of the Iraqi state, 
the British appointed the Hashemite Faisal bin Hussein as the new King, starting the long 
tradition of the British appointing almost exclusively Sunni Arab elite to government and 
ministry positions.99 While there was an early demand for independence during the Great Iraqi 
Revolution (May—November, 1920), the British did not grant independence to Iraq until 1932. 
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For the next 20 years, the monarchy struggled, facing stagnant per capita income and human 
development due to Britain’s continued control of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Despite the 
deplorable levels of poverty within the country, Iraq received little in exchange for its most 
precious resource for the first two decades after its inception until the 1950s when oil revenues 
increased.100 According to a World Bank report from 1952, despite being rich in oil and natural 
resources, most of Iraq was impoverished, with an extremely low standard of living and 
considerable unemployment plaguing the state. The report assessed that almost 90 percent of the 
population was illiterate, and subject to diseases such as malaria, hookworm, and bilharzia as 
Iraq’s housing and sanitation for the most part were primitive. Additionally, much of the 
available water was wasted owing to a lack of storage and regulation, contributing to the poor 
agricultural output.101 In short: Iraq was failing.  
 Thus, it comes as no surprise that in 1958, in response to the dire state of things in Iraq, 
the monarchy was deposed in a violent military coup led by General Abed al-Karim Qasim and 
Abdul Salam Arif in what is now known as the July 14th revolution. Qasim and his Free Officers 
established Iraq as a republic, intending to completely overhaul society through social, 
legislative, and economic reform.102 Although important efforts were made at developing 
infrastructure, such as the construction of roads, dams, and bridges, in addition to creation of an 
educated middle class, this revolution marked the beginning of a 45-year period of autocratic 
rule, which was naturally detrimental to Iraq’s strength of civil society, its political culture, and 
the government’s levels of legitimacy. The few trappings of democracy that accompanied the 
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revolution gradually slipped away over the next decade as various civilian and military groups 
vied for control of the state through regional and ethnic revolts, brutal suppressions, and the 
banning or purging of political parties all together.103 With this oppression of civil society and 
the subsequent flattening of any political opposition, Iraq’s organic chance at democracy was 
never realized. It then follows that Iraqis failed to develop any sense of democratic political 
belief or culture. Iraq’s absence of democratic history thus substantially diminished its prospects 
for democratization. 
 Another exhibit of instability and violence within Iraq, and the catalyst for Saddam 
Hussein’s eventual rise to power, was the Baath party’s conquest of the government in July of 
1968. The Iraqi Baath party was first established in Syria in the 1940s, only forming an Iraqi 
branch in 1952. Traditionally, its platform was built on Pan-Arab ideology, favoring unity for the 
Arab people, socialism, and the freedom for Iraq to determine its own path.104 The Baath party 
was not always a Sunni-dominated organization: it still included 54 percent Shia membership 
from 1952 to 1963, but from 1963 to 1970, that number was reduced to 6 percent.105 Thus, the 
party became known for its exclusion from power on the basis of ethno-religious background and 
its strong contempt for democracy, exhibited by the Baathists’ assassinations of leading members 
of the Iraqi government, their series of executions of rival dissenters in a reign of terror, and their 
elimination of all forms of opposition.106 All told, the new Baathist party arrested, tortured, and 
executed an estimated 3,000 members of the Iraqi Communist Party in an attempt to terrify the 
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Iraqi people into subservience.107 Finally, when General Saddam Hussein rose to power in 1979, 
a member of the Baath party, the government’s system of oppression only became worse.  
 It is especially important to examine Hussein’s regime, as his was the regime that 
preceded the United States’ invasion in 2003, and subsequent attempt at democratization. With 
his presidency, Iraq transitioned from an autocratic state to a personal cult with a despotic regime 
that was dependent on Saddam Hussein and his close family members and cohorts. Thus, what 
little pluralism and balance that remained in the highest echelons of Iraqi government completely 
disappeared.108 Elevated to General of the Iraqi Armed Forces in 1976, Saddam became the de 
facto leader of Iraq years before his official presidency in 1979, during which time he 
consolidated his power over the government and the Baath party. The state became increasingly 
centered on Saddam as he eliminated rivals brutally: this included the execution of key members 
of the governing council within days of his inauguration, imprisonment of ministry officials, and 
mass executions of Communist and Dawa Party activists. This was done in an attempt to crush 
any kind of opposition to Saddam, completely eliminating any possibility for civil society 
organization or a democratic political culture.  
Overall, Saddam’s rule was typified by extreme levels of spying, intimidation, 
oppression, and torture carried out by the Jihaz al-Amn al-Khaass (The Special Security 
Organization).109 The secret police, known as the Mukhabarat, encouraged civilians to denounce 
family members, friends, or anyone who was close to them who might be deemed a threat to 
Saddam’s rule.110 It was essentially forbidden to question any of Saddam’s inhumane actions. 
These policies were financed by Iraq’s increasing oil wealth, which, however profitable, was 
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ultimately unsustainable as the power was concentrated largely in the hands of a single 
individual.111 Despite the economy’s growth in the 1970s, oil revenues consolidated the 
hegemony of the political elite by providing it with the necessary financial resources to 
strengthen its agenda.112 Essentially, the wealth Iraq collected in the 1970s was unavailable to the 
majority of its population. Furthermore, during the Iran-Iraq war itself (1980-1988), Saddam 
Hussein’s policies caused over 100,000 people to be killed within his own state, and over a 
million people to be displaced.113 Two years later, Iraq faced yet another armed conflict when 
Saddam invaded Kuwait and the United States responded. The ensuing Gulf War, which lasted 
until 1991, resulted in further consequences for the Iraqi people. To illustrate this point, it is 
estimated that in the uprising within Iraq following the Gulf War, between 20,000 and 100,000 
civilians died, in addition to the 15,000 to 30,000 Kurds who died in refugee camps.114 For 
almost a quarter century, an entire generation in Iraq knew nothing but harsh autocratic rule that 
crushed civil society, worsened economic prospects, and decreased legitimacy of government as 
well as any chance at organically fostering a democratic political culture.  
 Equally as important as Iraq’s political history is Iraq’s ethno-religious sectarian conflict, 
as Iraq has always been a religiously and ethnically divided country. In 1932, the year of its 
independence, its population was made up of 21 percent Sunni Arabs, 14 percent Sunni Kurds, 
53 percent Shia Arabs, 5 percent non-Muslim Arabs, and the final 6 percent composed of other 
religious groups.115 These three main sects—Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Sunni Kurds—create 
the lines upon which Iraq is divided. King Faisal even proclaimed in 1932: “I have to say that it 
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is my belief that there is no Iraqi people inside Iraq. There are only diverse groups with no 
national sentiments.”116 While it is true that for the majority of the time, Sunnis and Shia live 
side by side without fighting, their sectarian identities always played a role in politics, as 
Parliamentary lines followed ethno-religious preference. Saddam enforced these sectarian 
divisions with horrific levels of violence, hardening the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish identities and 
flattening any kind of resistance within the country. With a Sunni minority in a position of power 
within an oppressive government for almost 100 years, the Shia and Kurdish communities 
experienced increasing levels of antagonism (especially from Saddam’s regime) to the already-
existing sectarian tension.117 Iraq’s neighbors have also intensified the conflict, using the ethnic 
and religious divides to advance their own agendas. Iraq is thus largely held together by its 
artificial borders as it has never been ethnically, religiously, or culturally homogenous, another 
characteristic associated with democracy. While the United States itself is an exception to Dahl’s 
observation that democracies will develop more easily in homogenous countries, Iraq—in 
addition to its sectarian divides—faces further obstacles to democracy, such as its lack of 
democratic experience and its illegitimate government, that all together inhibit its ability to 
successfully democratize.  
 Today, the majority of the Kurdish population in Iraq resides in the state’s three most 
northern provinces, a region which is unofficially regarded as Kurdistan. In fact, when Iraq was 
first created, the Kurds sought autonomy on educational, linguistic, cultural, and other matters, 
but were largely ignored for decades.118 The Kurds wished for their own country, and felt 
slighted by being labeled a minority in the predominantly Arab Iraq. Indeed, after a decade of 
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violent conflict in the 1960s, on March 28 1970 the Kurds were acknowledged as a political 
party with a Constitutional amendment that would recognize the Kurdish population as one of 
the main components of the Iraqi nation and would allow for the Kurdish language to be 
recognized as an official language alongside Arabic.119 Four years later, in 1974, the Kurds were 
extended regional autonomous privileges by Baghdad, although it remained clear that all 
legislation emanating from the region had to exist “within the state’s general policy,” thus 
placing the Kurds in a position of subservience to the Arab population in Iraq.120 This decision, 
while initially beneficial for the Kurds, established the principle of decentralization in Iraq that 
would later be reflected in the United States’ construction of government, and eventually 
contribute to the failure of Bush’s democratization experiment in the Middle East. It is important 
to note here that this would not be a reflection of Lijphart’s Consociational Democracy, as the 
Kurds did not have true control over their own domestic issues. Additionally, the ethno-religious 
groups in Iraq do not all face a single external threat, and thus the political elites are not 
compelled to come together in a cartel to govern the state together. With the rise of Saddam’s 
Baathist party in 1974, the Sunni minority again imposed a brutal authoritarian regime upon 
Kurdish and Shia populations.121  
Tensions were only exacerbated throughout Iraq due to the devastation of the Iran-Iraq 
war, extending from 1980 until 1988, and the Gulf War, lasting from 1990 to 1991. Saddam 
Hussein initiated the Iran-Iraq war as an attempt to re-assert dominance over border territories 
between the two states: in particular, the debate over the sovereignty of the Shatt al-‘Arab, a river 
formed at the meeting of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that was historically the border between 
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Iran and Iraq. While the United States initially supported Iraq during the war, its international 
standing was damaged when Saddam used chemical weapons on Iraqi-Kurdish civilians, the 
majority of whom supported Iran in the war. Kurdistan was thus devastated during the Iran-Iraq 
war with massive killings at the hands of the Saddam Hussein regime, as exemplified by the 
attack on Halabjah in March 1988, where approximately 5,000 Kurdish civilians were killed.122 
Even though Kurdistan was given protection after the Gulf War with a U.S.-mandated no-fly 
zone under Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, the ethnic violence 
and brutalization of the Kurds at the hands of the Baathists, which lasted for years, prevented 
Kurdistan from fully transitioning to a semi-autonomous state. The Gulf War also gave rise to 
obscene violence against the Shia Arabs in Iraq, who were encouraged by the United States to 
rise up against Saddam’s dictatorship, but when they did they were met with subsequent 
repression and violence.123 Iraq’s lack of ethnic, cultural, or religious homogeneity, while only 
one aspect under consideration in its struggle for democracy, is certainly an important factor. If 
we recall, democracy scholars argue that a heterogeneous society is characteristically less likely 
to develop democracy. This fact, coupled with Saddam’s efforts to destroy any kind of civil 
society organizations that were seen as a danger to his regime, or representative of intersectional 
communities within Iraq, makes it that much more difficult for the state to develop or maintain 
any Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy.124  
As we have discussed, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War aggravated the already-
existing sectarian divides within Iraq, creating an extremely polarized society upon which the 
United States attempted to develop democracy. However, these two wars, with the addition of 
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the resulting economic sanctions, also devastated Iraq’s economy, another important indicator 
associated with democratization. Under Saddam’s rule, economic data were considered state 
secrets, thus much of the reliable data for the era was eliminated. It is estimated, however, that 
before the Gulf War, oil accounted for more than 60 percent of the country’s GDP (but only 
employs 2-3 percent of the labor force) and 95 percent of foreign currency earnings. The CIA’s 
economic intelligence unit estimates that Iraq’s GDP stood at roughly $38 billion in 1989 due to 
the state’s rapidly growing oil wealth since its nationalization of oil in 1972.125 Additionally, 
unlike most Gulf States, Iraq has considerable agricultural potential: about 12 percent of its land 
is arable, of which 4 percent is irrigated. Another 9 percent is suitable for grazing, and 3 percent 
is forested.126 This agricultural potential was not realized during Saddam’s regime, however, as 
most economic efforts were focused on the production of oil, as evidenced by the following 
excerpt from the 2004 Economic Intelligence Unit:  
 
Under the Ba’ath party, activity in the food and agriculture sectors of the economy 
continued to decline. Government expenditures on agriculture dropped from 18 percent 
of total government expenditures in 1976 to less than 10 percent in 1980 and continued to 
decline during the Iran-Iraq war. Under Saddam, as a result of drought, lack of inputs, 
poor methods and weak administration, Iraq was unable to achieve agricultural 
production levels near its potential. Following the first Gulf war, the irrigation systems 
fell into disrepair and much of the irrigated cropland in central and southern Iraq was 
badly damaged by salinization. Rapid population growth during the past three decades, 
coupled with limited arable land and an overall stagnation in agricultural production has 
steadily increased Iraq’s dependence on imports to meet domestic food needs.127 
 
Unlike Haiti, due to its natural resources, Iraq could have had the economic development levels 
that Lipset and Huntington say are required for a democracy. Instead, however, its economic 
potential was undermined by Saddam’s rule. It can thus be seen that Iraq was struggling 
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economically even before the United Nations imposed the harsh sanctions on the state in an 
effort to punish Saddam Hussein for invading Kuwait.  
 In August of 1990, the UN Security Council imposed the most comprehensive and 
restricting sanctions regime ever devised (to date) in order to coerce Iraq to withdraw from 
Kuwait. After the war ended, however, these sanctions remained in place until 2003, and were 
only modified in 1996 with the United Nation’s Oil for Food program (UNOFF). The initial 
sanctions, instituted by UN Security Council Resolution 687, mandated that Iraq could not 
import or export anything for any reason, reducing the country to beggar status while leaving its 
senior leadership virtually unscathed, as it was discovered that Saddam pocketed at least $1.8 
billion at the expense of Iraqis suffering under the UN sanctions.128 Iraqis were hungry and sick 
as public sector salaries were cut to around $2 per month, poverty rates grew, and basic 
medicines ceased to be available. Without oil export revenues, the Iraqi government could not 
allocate any funds to education, transportation, housing, or infrastructure for over a decade.129 
Although Iraq’s economic prowess early on would suggest high levels of urbanization and 
education (Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy), these factors were marred and 
stunted by these devastating economic sanctions, further inhibiting democracy.  
Dennis Halliday, a former UN humanitarian coordinator placed in Iraq to monitor the Oil 
for Food program, contended that the economic sanctions constituted “genocide” due to their 
responsibility for the deaths of thousands each month in Iraq, and their exposure of millions of 
people to starvation or malnutrition, and sickness.130 As the UN Security Council would not 
allow oil revenues to be spent on the repair of infrastructure, there was no way for Iraq to 
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adequately repair water, power, or sewage systems critical in the battle to save lives of infants 
and children. Funding was also not available for the reequipping of hospitals. With these factors 
in mind, Halliday argues: “with or without original intent, the impact of economic sanctions 
constitutes genocide.”131 Thus, the Iraqi state inherited by the US-led occupation force in 2003 
had already been dramatically weakened by the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the corresponding 
economic sanctions, the ensuing delegitimization of government, and finally the invasion 
itself.132 As argued by our democracy scholars, this economic failure (contributing to low levels 
of education and urbanization) again inhibits and sometimes even prevents democratization. It is 
clear that in the years leading up to the 2003 invasion, Iraq encompassed characteristics that are 
extremely unfavorable to democracy: insurgency, illegitimacy of government, violence, ethnic 
rivalry, economic failure and harsh autocratic rule. Even before the United States invaded Iraq in 
2003, the state possessed structural obstacles to democratization that prevented it from 
developing any Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy. 
 
 
PLANNING DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ: THE INVASION AND THE ACTIONS OF THE CPA (2003-2004) 
 
 The Bush administration both created and faced many of the Obstacles to Democracy 
and Democratization in its planning and implementation of liberal democracy in Iraq. These 
obstacles resulted from Bush’s failure to view Iraq as distinct and unique, separate from his 
desires for a stable, democratic, and pro-Western Middle East. His administration did not take 
into account Iraq’s political, ethno-religious, and economic conditions prior to the invasion. 
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Additionally, the planners viewed the removal of Saddam as the equivalent to the creation of 
democracy in Iraq, forgetting that Iraq has had a total lack of democratic experience, or any 
previous political commitment to democratic values. This section will analyze the Obstacles to 
Democracy with the structure and characteristics identified in chapter one, and previously 
applied to Haiti. As we will see, the CPA’s actions in Iraq after the initial invasion only 
exacerbated the divides within society, failed to alleviate poverty in the provinces outside of 
Baghdad, and dramatically increased levels of violence in the state due to the insurgency as a 
reaction to the United States’ actions; all obstacles to democratization according to scholars such 
as Dahl, Huntington, Zakaria, and Whitehead. Most importantly, the United States again viewed 
elections as the final step in a militarized democratization effort, failing to design a mission with 
the necessary time and scope for successful democratization, and thus leading to a collapse of a 
hastily and poorly constructed “democratic” government in Iraq. 
 
Obstacles to Democracy: Planning for Iraq  
It would be impossible to analyze the United States’ attempted democratization of Iraq 
without examining President Bush’s stated reasons for the intervention. While it is widely 
acknowledged that the Bush administration’s economic concerns over oil, and its security 
concerns regarding terrorism were key motivators for invading Iraq in 2003, what is more 
relevant to this thesis is the Bush administration’s belief that exporting democracy to Iraq would 
not only be easy, but that it would also lead to a larger wave of freedom throughout the Middle 
East. In the years and months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration pivoted 
from a strategy of containment (of Iraq) to a strategy of preemption in the Middle East. Up until 
2003, the United States had been content to contain Saddam Hussein with multilateral economic 
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sanctions put in place by the UN. However, this strategy was replaced with the Bush Doctrine in 
light of the events of 9/11, which favored preemptive strikes against known enemies, unilateral 
action, military preeminence, and the promotion of democratic regime change.133  
9/11 provided an opportunity for the Bush administration to enact its agenda, bolstered by 
the neoconservative security argument for going to war in Iraq that had been brewing since the 
1990s. The neoconservative movement’s central interest was America’s role in global security, 
with a unified goal for the U.S. to eliminate threats to the security of America and its allies. They 
were also influenced by the Wilsonian tradition of making the world safe for democracy.134 After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, at the start of what many thought to be a “new world order,” 
Francis Fukuyama’s claim that the triumph of Western liberal democracy signified the “end of 
history” was a harbinger of later, rather ethnocentric arguments that the exporting of Western 
ideals (democracy and capitalism) would serve the larger interests of humanity.135  
A full decade before the plans were drawn to invade Iraq, this theme of exporting 
Western liberal democracy can be seen in Paul Wolfowitz, “Scooter” Libby, and Zalmay 
Khalizad’s “Defense Planning Guidance” document, as requested by Defense Secretary Richard 
Cheney in 1992. Wolfowitz would go on to become Donald Rumsfeld’s Deputy Secretary of 
Defense in 2001, with Libby serving as Cheney’s chief of staff. The document advocates for the 
United States to show the leadership necessary to establish and protect this new world order, to 
address sources of regional conflict and instability, to promote democracy and free markets 
globally, and to retain “preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which 
threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle 
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international relations.”136 Emphasized primarily in the list of U.S. interests is the protection of 
Persian Gulf Oil, connecting Iraq to these ideas of exporting democracy to protect U.S. interests. 
This document was later incorporated into the Project for the New American Century, and then 
brought back into the administration when they returned as policy makers under George W. 
Bush, helping to construct his National Security Strategy of 2002. Wolfowitz himself called for 
the overthrow of Saddam as early as November of 1997, stating that the U.S. should not “be 
afraid to go after targets that constitute the support of Saddam’s regime” with a “willingness to 
act unilaterally…because the international consensus is weak.”137 Finally, in early 2000, 
Condoleezza Rice—Bush’s National Security Advisor at the time of the invasion—outlined a 
post-Cold War foreign policy that argued above all, “the next president must be comfortable with 
America’s special role as the world’s leader,” words that anticipated Bush’s freedom agenda in 
the coming years.138 This confidence in the United States’ ideals would only increase during 
Bush’s presidency, where he leveraged the emotional devastation from 9/11 to further his 
administration’s interests to democratize Iraq in what he and his advisors believed would be the 
first step in democratizing the Middle East.  
The Bush administration’s insistence that Iraq was a threat to world peace made Saddam 
Hussein the focal point around which the neoconservatives could reorganize world politics 
through the construction of a war that had little support globally to militarily democratize Iraq. 
Scholars such as David Beetham and Fareed Zakaria, who are referenced in the literature review, 
argue that even the concept of militarized democratization itself is an obstacle to democracy, as it 
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undermines the very nature of democracy and its concepts of freedom and self-determination.139 
The Bush administration propagated the view that pro-western democracy can be created, 
manufactured, and shipped off to foreign countries—even when there seems to be little evidence 
for its success in any historical or structural sense. This confidence is shown again and again in 
the planning and implementation of the Iraq War, thus reinforcing the concept of militarized 
democracy, which as we know, is actually a known obstacle to democracy.  
The infamous Downing Street Memo, written a little under a year before the invasion of 
Iraq, and months before the United States would ask the UN Security Council to authorize 
renewed weapons inspections, noted “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, 
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being 
fixed around the policy.”140 The United States, from the planning to the execution of the 
invasion, lacked the legitimacy needed to successfully democratize Iraq. According to the UN 
(Chapter VII of the UN Charter), the desire for regime change is not a legal basis for military 
action. Furthermore, the United States could not claim self-defense: Iraq was not threatening its 
neighbors, nor was its military capability any greater than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran.141 
Most importantly, Bush failed to receive authorization for the use of force from the UN Security 
Council. One month later, however, Cheney confidently announced, “there is no doubt that 
Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to 
use against our friends, against our allies, and against us… With our help a liberated Iraq can be 
a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has unlimited 
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potential for a peaceful, prosperous future.”142 In October of the same year, the Bush 
administration received the proper authorization from Congress for the use of force in Iraq.  
Regardless of the lack of multilateral approval, the only thing that mattered in this new 
world order was U.S. military power and the ability to use it preemptively. By the time President 
Bush announced the beginning of “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in March of 2003, Saddam Hussein 
and his WMD’s had become the public justification for unilateral, militarized democratization. In 
his announcement to the world concerning the start of “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” President 
Bush assured his viewers that “we have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and 
restore control of that country to its own people.”143 Whether or not this is actually true, it is 
important to note the administration’s connections to oil companies such as Chevron and 
Halliburton, which accompanied the administration’s belief that bringing democracy and free 
markets to Iraq would be beneficial to America’s economy and security.144 Despite the Bush 
administration’s confidence that democracy could easily be exported to Iraq, the plans for its 
democratization never considered Iraq’s unique social, political, or economic contexts, or the 
fact that Iraq had a distinct absence of democratic experience, a characteristic that scholars argue 
is a key obstacle to democracy. President Bush and his administration simply assumed that with 
the removal of Saddam, the U.S. military would be seen as liberators, evidenced by Vice 
President Cheney, who when asked to discuss the invasion, bluntly responded: “My belief is we 
will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”145 The Bush administration considered Saddam to be 
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Iraq’s only obstacle to democracy, thus ignoring other important Obstacles to Democracy and 
Democratization in Iraq itself, such as its absence of democratic experience, its divided society, 
its poverty, and its lack of stability.  
Bush’s desire to democratize Iraq was misguided from the start: a woeful lack of 
historical understanding combined with ideas of Western superiority led his administration to 
believe that it could waltz into Iraq, democratize the state for the benefit of the United States, and 
wrap things up before it got too messy. There is clearly a gap between the Bush administration’s 
declared policies—wrapped in moral discourse—and the realities of its proposed actions.146 The 
Bush administration propagated the view that pro-Western democracy can be created, 
manufactured, and shipped off to foreign countries, even when there seems to be little evidence 
for its success in any historical or structural sense when considering Iraq itself. 
 
 
Obstacles to Democracy: The Actions of the CPA (March 2003—June 2004) 
 
In order to go about democratizing Iraq, the Pentagon established the Office for 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) on January 20, 2003, two months before 
Bush sent troops into Iraq. OHRA reported directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
and was headed by Ret. Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, who had helped coordinate relief operations in 
northern Iraq after the first Gulf War. However, Garner’s initial desire to rely on local Iraqis and 
his refusal to abolish the Baath party led to the Defense Department dissolving OHRA on April 
21 2003.147 OHRA was then replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), lead by L. 
Paul Bremer, who served from May 11 2003 to June 28 2004, the date when the U.S. occupying 
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forces restored limited sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government. Douglas Feith, the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Head of the Office of Special Plans, expected that the 
reconstruction of the Iraqi government would be easy—lasting no more ninety days—since 
grateful Iraqis would greet the Americans as liberators. Feith’s optimism was also shared by 
Preside Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and National Security 
Advisor Rice.148 This clearly signifies an insufficient time commitment to the growth of 
democratic institutions, a characteristics that Whitehead argues is one of our Obstacles to 
Democracy and Democratization. In actuality the CPA’s occupation lasted over a year, and the 
United States left Iraq well before it had accomplished the goals that it had put forth. As revealed 
in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feith did not want to waste time 
“theorizing” what to do, as he intended the CPA to be an “expeditionary” office relying on 
practical work.149 Thus, rather than a carefully thought out developmental project to achieve 
lasting democratic institutions, the CPA’s construction presented a lack of nuanced 
understanding of democracy and its requirements from the very start.  
As we now know, due to a series of mistaken assumptions, almost everything in Iraq 
post-invasion had to be reconstructed: army and police, governmental ministries, banking and 
education systems, and basic infrastructure for delivering and generating electricity and water, 
handling sewage, and producing and delivering oil.150 The United States did not have sufficient 
plans in place for rebuilding Iraq post-invasion: thus, hopes for organizing a pro-U.S. liberal 
democracy and privatizing Iraq’s economy collapsed.  
                                                
148 John Ehrenberg, J. Patrice McSherry, José Ramón Sánchez, and Caroleen Marji Sayej. The Iraq 
Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 163 
149 Douglas J. Feith, Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 11, 2003  
150 Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sánchez, and Sayej, The Iraq Papers, 165. 
 
	   75 
Paul Bremer’s actions leading the CPA in his first few months in Baghdad only served to 
further damage the state, dividing Iraq’s society, creating violence that lead to the insurgency 
against the U.S. military, and undermining the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government by 
unilaterally controlling the key executive, judicial, and legislative decisions made early on. In 
short: with its poor planning, the United States helped to create significant Obstacles to 
Democracy and Democratization in Iraq rather than cultivating an environment conducive to 
democratization. In Orders 1 and 2, issued on May 16 and May 23 of 2003, respectively, Bremer 
gutted the governmental and military institutions that existed in Iraq, leaving behind no 
institutional memory and little stability or legitimacy (obstacles to democracy). These orders 
were made against the judgment of Jay Garner, the senior CIA officer in Iraq, and against the 
advice of military planners. Additionally, Bremer acted without consultation with Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General Myers, Vice Chair Peter Pace, General McKiernan, CIA Director George Tenet, or 
Intelligence Community lead for the Middle East Paul Pillar.151 Guided by the notion that the 
removal of all things related to Saddam Hussein’s regime would end Iraq’s problems, Bremer’s 
initial policies politically cleansed the state.152 His intentions are made clear in the infamous 
CPA Orders 1 and 2, which dissolved and dismantled the Iraqi state, removing everything and 
everyone associated with the Baath Party.153 This decision effectively eliminated the leadership 
and top technical capacity for universities, hospitals, transportation, electricity, and 
communications, weakening the existing infrastructure and institutions within the state, 
demonstrating again how the United States helped to create Obstacles to Democracy within Iraq. 
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While Bremer claimed that the order would only affect 20,000 people, the total amounted to 
more than 100,000, including approximately 40,000 schoolteachers who had joined the Baath 
party only to keep their jobs.154 The second order was even more devastating, as the members of 
the security forces in Iraq amounted to over 385,000, all of whom were now also jobless and 
angry. The following is a list of the “Dissolved Entities” from CPA Order 2:155  
 
The Ministry of Defense 
The Ministry of Information  
The Ministry of State for Military Affairs  
The Iraqi Intelligence Service 
The National Security Bureau  
The Directorate of National Security  
The Special Security Organization  
The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defense Force, and other regular military services  
The Republican Guard  
The Special Republican Guard  
The Directorate of Military Intelligence  
The Al Quds Force  
Emergency Forces  
All Paramilitaries  
The Presidential Diwan 
The Presidential Secretariat  
The National Assembly 
The Youth Organization 
National Olympic Committee  
 
 Not only did these orders alienate hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who were now jobless, 
but they also created a security vacuum, which allowed for the development of a violent 
insurgency—characteristics that our scholars have identified as Obstacles to Democracy and 
Democratization. Clearly, the massive extent to which Bremer cleansed the Iraqi state reveals a 
failure to preserve any existing capacity of Iraqi state institutions, severely reducing Iraq’s 
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chances at democratization.156 What is so tragic about these first two orders is that under 
Garner’s guidance, they were never supposed to occur. According to Colin Powell, a very 
different plan had been approved previously at the highest level:  
 
When we went in, we had a plan, which the President approved. We would not break up  
and disband the Iraqi army. We would use the reconstituted army with purged leadership  
to help us secure and maintain order throughout the country. We would dissolve the 




In addition to this, Bremer’s actions worsened Iraq’s economic situation and made clear that the 
United States was not interested in including the views of the Sunni minority because it was 
tainted with the memory of the Baath Party. In his memoirs, Bremer reaffirmed his belief that 
Iraq’s democratization process was analogous to the democratization and reconstruction efforts 
in Germany and Japan post-WWII, stating “we had to build a success story here that, like 
Germany and Japan, still looked good after fifty years,” again failing to realize that Iraq is unique 
in its historical context.158 Most people in Iraq thus saw the war as an occupation rather than a 
liberation, and rightfully so: by October 2003, a poll was conducted in Baghdad that revealed 
only 4.6 percent of the population saw the United States as liberators or peace keepers.159 Again, 
we see that the Bush administration had little understanding of the political and historical 
realities that dominated the region.   
The CPA’s next step was to draft a constitution, and Paul Bremer’s first impulse was to 
appoint a drafting committee that would write the document and organize a government friendly 
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to the United States. The Iraqis, however, would not allow the United States to completely co-opt 
the democratization process. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most senior cleric in Shia Islam, 
issued a Fatwa in June of 2003 stating that only elected experts should be involved in composing 
the new constitution. The Fatwa strongly asserted that, “there must be a general election so that 
every Iraqi citizen—who is eligible to vote—can choose someone to represent him in a 
foundational Constitutional preparation assembly.”160 This moment signified a rare instance in 
the history of the CPA where Bremer chose to change course: on July 13th of the same year, the 
CPA announced a 25 member Iraq Governing Council (IGC), whose purpose would be to serve 
as the provisional government. The Council was charged with drafting a temporary constitution 
that would organize elections for a national assembly, write a permanent constitution, and 
establish a sovereign government. However, the 25 members promoted to the IGC were 
apportioned according to a strict ethnic and religious groupings, effectively forcing the council to 
function based on identity politics, which only served to increase sectarian tensions throughout 
the drafting process of the constitution.161 The way the CPA organized its democratization efforts 
thus led to a radicalization of ethno-nationalist parties and an upward spiraling of their 
demands.162 In addition to the existing sectarian tensions in Iraq, the United States was complicit 
in further dividing Iraq’s society, thus helping to create identifiable obstacles to democracy 
within the state.  
Bremer approached the rest of the CPA’s timeline with a set of seven steps that would, he 
claimed, ultimately lead to sovereignty. The first step, as discussed previously, was the creation 
of the IGC. Reproduced below is Bremer’s list of steps: 
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1. Creating a 25 member Governing Council broadly representative of Iraqi society.  
2. Appointing a preparatory committee to devise a way to write a constitution.  
3. Appointing ministers who serve at the pleasure of the Governing Council with the 
purpose of setting policy. 
4. Writing Iraq’s new constitution. 
5. Popular ratification of the constitution.  
6. Election of a government. When that government is elected, Iraq will have a 
government designed and selected by Iraqis. It will be unique in Iraq’s history and 
will send a powerful message about democracy to other countries in the region.  
7. Dissolving the Coalition authority, which will follow naturally on the heels of the 
election. The coalition authority will then yield the remainder of its authority to a now 
sovereign Iraq.163   
 
There can be no greater certainty that Bremer, the CPA, and the Bush administration viewed 
elections as the final step in democratization. Such thinking, as we know, can be a major obstacle 
to achieving democracy. Additionally, there is no mention in this list of fostering a politically 
informed civil society, or strong rule of law, characteristics necessary for a functional and 
successful democracy. Furthermore, Bremer failed to clear this list with the State Department, 
Defense Department, or the White House, all of which were very concerned with the possibility 
of a long occupation and promptly instructed Bremer to drop his plans and focus on a rapid 
transfer to sovereignty: the new deadline for transfer of sovereignty was to be no later than June 
30, 2004.164 This deadline conveniently preceded the upcoming mid-term elections that coming 
November in the United States, where the administration itself would be tested. Bush wanted a 
victory, and he viewed the transition of governance from the CPA to Iraq as signifying freedom 
and democracy for Iraq. We know that this was not in fact the case. It is evident that the United 
States exhibited an insufficient time commitment to the construction of a functional democracy 
from the start in favor of a quick and easy “victory.”  
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In November of 2003, the CPA began its work on Iraq’s interim constitution, as 
designated in step four of Bremer’s plan, which would later be known as the Transitional 
Administrative Law, or TAL when it was officially issued on March 8, 2004.165 This was the 
step in the CPA’s timeline, however, that would prove to be Bremer’s undoing. Although the 
CPA claimed that it would consult with the IGC on all matters, the drafting process of the 
interim constitution was secretive, and ill-managed: the CPA appointed a small group of US 
officials and academics and two Iraqi-American jurists to write TAL, which was first drafted in 
English and only later translated to Arabic when it became necessary to share some of the 
provisions with the IGC.166 TAL specified a series of rights, organized state institutions, and 
established federal relations between the capital and the regions, most importantly recognizing a 
measure of autonomy for the Kurds while “reserving control of fiscal, defense, and foreign 
policy for Baghdad.”167 While the constitution attempted to centralize the provisional 
government in a construction of liberal democracy, the initial organization of the IGC (based on 
ethno-religious identity) would undermine the government as votes and decisions broke down 
along sectarian lines. The vast majority of Iraq’s political class, including Dawa, the Sadrist 
movement, the Iraqiya alliance, and the Iraqi Islamic Party, were not given a voice in the IGC. 
The constitution advocated for federalism based on fundamentalism, not on legitimate 
geographical areas.168 This process ultimately robbed legitimacy and authenticity of government 
from the Iraqi people, sowing seeds of contention and protest early on.  
Bremer must have been aware of the discontent of the Iraqis, however, as the day before 
the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people, he issued CPA order 17, which gave 
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immunity to all external actors involved in the attempted democratization of Iraq. Section two 
goes as far as to explicitly state: “Unless provided otherwise herein, the MNF, the CPA, Foreign 
Liaison Missions, their personnel, property, funds and assets, and all International Consultants 
shall be immune from Iraqi legal process,” thus excluding the offending parties from Iraq’s rule 
of law.169 The United States created a safeguard to avoid responsibility for the mess it had 
caused. On June 28, 2004, having accomplished only four of Bremer’s seven goals, the CPA was 
succeeded by the collaborating interim Iraqi government, headed by Ayad Allawi, a secularized 
Shiite. The transfer of power was conducted in secret, as the Bush administration feared a violent 
reaction from the Iraqi people if the ceremony had been in public. While the United States had 
caused a civil war in Iraq due to its occupation, resulting in increasing levels of violence, 
instability, and division, the Iraqis were left alone to ratify a permanent constitution and elect a 
new government in the hopes of achieving democracy. Bush’s invasion of Iraq aggravated the 
country’s already-existing Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization, such as its absence of 
democratic experience and divided society, as well as creating even more obstacles by 
sabotaging any efforts to construct a democratic government as evidenced by the United States’ 
insufficient time commitment in Iraq, its exacerbation of violence through militarized 
democratization, and its failure to view democracy as more than an election. 
 
 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CPA: EVALUATING DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ  
 
 This final section of the Iraq case evaluates “Operation Iraqi Freedom” after the transfer 
of power from the CPA to the Iraqi people. It applies the Universal Characteristics of 
Democracy, as identified previously in the theoretical section and discussed in the Haiti case, to 
the failed state of democratization in Iraq. As we will see, Iraq’s lack of alignment with the 
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Universal Characteristics of Democracy signifies the United States’ failure to successfully 
democratize Iraq. The Bush administration (much like the Clinton administration did in its Haiti 
intervention) viewed elections as the final step in the creation of a democracy, when in fact Iraq 
was far from achieving a democratic government. From the very beginning, the creation of Iraq’s 
constitution sabotaged its prospects for democracy—because the Iraqi people were not given full 
control over their constitution, it cannot be seen as legitimate. Additionally, the Iraqi people did 
not fully control the construction of their new government, minimizing the potential for strong 
political leadership, legitimately representational parties, or stable democratic institutions. 
Furthermore, with the dissolution and rapid re-creation of the Iraqi Army, the state did not have a 
reliable control of force, contributing to the insurgency. Accordingly, the insurgency and civil 
war then inhibited sustained freedom of expression and civil society organization and 
participation in the new “democracy” due to the brutal violence it created. Iraq is a sobering 
reminder that elections, while an important part of democracy, are not enough to constitute a 
successful democratization effort. It is unfortunately clear that the majority of the Universal 
Characteristics of Democracy were not met long-term in Iraq, in no small way due to the Bush 
administration and CPA’s total failure to construct lasting democratic institutions that reflected a 
nuanced understanding of Iraq’s unique political, social, and economic history.  
 While the majority of the analysis of the CPA’s actions occurred in the previous section, 
the magnitude of its impact must also be considered. Therefore, this section will look at the years 
following its exit from Iraq (2004—2006) to assess why, based on the identified Universal 
Characteristics of Democracy, the Bush administration failed to achieve its goal of 
democratizing Iraq. While the CPA passed the torch to the Iraqis in June of 2004, there are 
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lingering legacies of destruction that arise not only in Iraq, but also in the region as a whole. As 
we will see, the Bush administration’s early optimism regarding democracy Iraq was not viable.  
Iraq held its first election after the CPA had left the country on January 30 2005 for 
drafting the constitution, accompanied by provincial elections and the election of the regional 
parliament in Iraqi Kurdistan. 11 months later, Iraq held a legislative election on December 15 
2005. These elections reflected a clear pattern of ethno-sectarian preference—the Sunnis 
boycotted the first election entirely, and the Shia and Kurds voted along ethno-religious lines, 
indicating the CPA’s divisive construction of the government.170 Due to the construction of the 
IGC and the constitution itself, this pattern of sectarian preference remained consistent in the 
years following the CPA’s exit from Iraq, and as none of the three major ethno-religious groups 
had a majority in the government, Iraq’s elected members would constantly have to work across 
sectarian lines in order to get anything done.171 These patterns reaffirm the lack of legitimacy and 
stability at the very core of Iraq’s new government: its constitution.  
In the elections that occurred in December of 2005, Iraq elected al-Jaffari as Prime 
Minister—this appointment, however, would not last long. The U.S. was unhappy with this turn 
of events due to his close cooperation with Iran, his growing unpopularity with the Iraqi people, 
and his failure to crack down on sectarian militias. Thus the Bush administration turned its 
attention to Nouri al-Maliki.172 In May of 2006, the Bush administration backed Maliki and he 
was elected the Prime Minister of Iraq. The United States would eventually regret supporting 
Maliki so fiercely as after 2006, he slowly built a shadow state that circumvented both the 
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existing governing elite and democratic oversight of the exercise of power.173 He placed his 
office at the center of state power, reducing the ability of the cabinet and parliament to influence 
policy—thus becoming more and more like an autocrat, and thus Iraq diminished as a 
democracy. He even placed his family members within the ranks of his party—the Dawa party. 
He appointed his son, Ahmed Maliki, as deputy chief of staff, giving him oversight across all of 
Iraq’s security services. Continuing his path towards autocracy, Maliki used a renewed de-
Baathification as a means of disqualifying political opponents.174 Iraq’s new government was 
repeating the actions of Hussein’s regime that had decimated the ability for civil society to 
participate in a democratic process, or for legitimate political parties to exist in the political 
sphere. Furthermore, while Iraq’s government was descending into corruption, the rest of the 
state was caught up in a seemingly endless civil war, contributing to a loss of basic freedoms of 
person, inclusive citizenship, and the rule of law. While elections are a universally agreed-upon 
method for implementing democracy (not to mention one of the identified Universal 
Characteristics of Democracy) for a democratic government to truly function, there is a need for 
a wider set of democratic values, principles, and characteristics than the U.S. planned for in 
Iraq’s fledgling “democracy.”  
Iraq’s civil society organizations also suffered at the hands of the CPA, which had 
focused almost exclusively on Baghdad (the center of Iraq’s oil production) while it ignored the 
rest of Iraq’s provinces. Because of this focus on Baghdad and oil, the majority of Iraq was not 
equally represented in its central government as it should have been in order for liberal 
democracy to function successfully. Accordingly, a more authentic grassroots experience of 
democracy through the provincial governorates was diluted and channeled through existing 
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power structures created by the CPA in Baghdad, limiting a large number of citizens’ ability to 
participate politically.175 While USAID sponsored some programs of engagement in civil 
organizations in the Provincial Governorates in the outer regions, they were not integrated into, 
nor had been allowed to influence, the top-level policy in Baghdad.176 Furthermore, the majority 
of the USAID programs were being tasked with a strict neo-liberal economic agenda of 
privatization at any cost in order to capitalize on oil, a sign of misdirected international funding 
that actually worked to inhibit Iraq’s development of democracy.177 Given this poor integration 
and communication between Baghdad, the International Zone of Baghdad otherwise known as 
“The Green Zone,” and the rest of the country, there was a clear lack of inclusive citizenship 
with the full ability to participate present during the United States’ occupation of Iraq. Worse 
still, the violence (not only in Iraq, but also in the region as a whole) and civil war that followed 
the invasion made it all the more difficult for Iraqi citizens to attain basic freedoms of person, let 
alone the ability to participate in their new government.178   
Iraq’s control of force and stability were also greatly strained due to the violence of the 
insurgency and subsequent civil war. The invasion had incapacitated Iraq’s infrastructure, while 
Bremer’s CPA had eliminated a large portion of Iraq’s existing political infrastructure. This 
deadly combination, instead of clearing the way for democracy as the Bush administration had 
hoped, only inhibited Iraq’s democratization prospects. After the CPA exited Iraq, the people’s 
resentment over the continuing weakness of state institutions and the state’s inability to deliver 
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even the most basic services only served to exacerbate the perception of widespread corruption, 
ineffectuality, and illegitimacy of government in Iraq. According to research conducted at Johns 
Hopkins School of Public Health, up to 700,000 people had been killed between the invasion and 
2006 alone.179 The total cost of damage done to Iraq is generally considered to be around $12 
billion, but from 2003—2011, the US government spent approximately $61.11 billion attempting 
to rebuild civil and military institutions in the state.180 Conditions were so bad, that in 2011 the 
UN estimated that only 26 percent of the population was covered by the public sewage network, 
and only 25 percent had access to safe drinking water.181 Iraq’s government, plagued by its weak 
institutions and damaged infrastructure further inhibited its control of force, its democratic 
leadership, and due to the violence from the insurgency, its basic freedoms of person.  
In attempting to construct a liberal democracy with the semblance of ethno-religious 
based federalism, the United States failed to account for the fact that Iraq lacked a majority of the 
Universal Characteristics of Democracy, including basic freedoms of person, the creation of a 
legitimate and lasting constitution, inclusive citizenship with the ability to participate politically, 
control of force and strong political leadership by an elected official, stability of democratic 
institutions, a functional and legitimate party system, justice, and rule of law. Even Robert Gates, 
who replaced Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in 2006 and was assigned to the Iraq Study 
Group, recognized the errors of implementation that essentially ensured the failure of militarized 
democratization. In his memoir he states that “we had simply no idea how broken Iraq was 
before the war—economically, socially, culturally, politically, in its infrastructure, the education 
system, you name it,” which returns to the idea that not only was the Bush administration’s 
implementation of democracy misguided, but that Iraq itself also faced structural obstacles to 
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democracy it could not overcome.182 Given the CPA’s destruction of established political 
institutions, its failure to include key societal groups, and its lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Iraqi people due to a top-down implementation strategy, it seems clear that Bush’s ideals of 
militarized democracy were incompatible in Iraq in their design, as well as in their 
implementation.  
 In light of the Bush administration’s misunderstandings of Iraq’s historical context, the 
destruction of Iraq’s existing political institutions, and the CPA’s complete failure to 
successfully implement democratic policies on the ground in Iraq, it is clear that this 
democratization project failed. In an exchange between Condoleezza Rice and President Bush on 
the day of the CPA’s transfer of power to Iraq (June 28 2004), Rice wrote: “Mr. President, Iraq is 
sovereign. Letter was passed from Bremer at 10:26 a.m. Iraq time.” In response, Bush declared: 
“Let Freedom Reign!”183 We now know that the foolish optimism of this exchange would not 
ring true. In the years following the CPA’s transfer of power back to the Iraqi people, the 
necessary characteristics for a successful and legitimate democracy were not met. Bush’s version 
of militarized democratization was never compatible with the creation of legitimate democracy 
in Iraq to begin with. Thus, it cannot be contested that “Operation Iraqi Freedom” brought 
neither freedom nor democracy to Iraq.  
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 Through a careful examination and analysis of the United States’ democratization efforts 
in Haiti and Iraq in 1994 and 2003, this thesis demonstrates that due to an inadequate 
understanding of democracy, poor assessments of each country’s historical, political, and social 
contexts as they relate to democratization, and various obstacles to democracy, the Clinton and 
Bush administrations failed to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq. The United States 
assumed it could impose a liberal democracy upon the existing conditions in Haiti and Iraq, 
failing to account for implicit, internal characteristics that were unfavorable to democracy itself. 
Furthermore, despite the obstacles to democracy encountered in each country, the Clinton and 
Bush administrations assumed that exporting democracy would not only be easy, but that it 
would be welcomed in each country. Finally, US policy makers viewed constructing elections in 
each country as equivalent to democracy, revealing a lack of understanding of the fundamental 
characteristics of democracy. Together, these cases suggest that the very practice of exporting 
democracy through military intervention alone cannot lead to sustainable democracy.  
 While many studies of democratization have been attempted by scholars in the field to 
understand how and why democracies flourish or fail, the research conducted for this project is 
distinct in that it relied on prominent democracy scholars to provide identifiable characteristics 
of democracy and then utilized these characteristics to analyze the military invasions and 
subsequent democratization attempts through military interventions in Haiti and Iraq. This was 
done in order to ask the question of where and why U.S. democracy planners went wrong in their 
efforts to export democracy to Haiti and Iraq. With the exception of Arend Lijphart, all of the 
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democratization scholars consulted (chosen due to their significance in the field and frequency of 
citation) showed a commitment to liberal, individual democracies characterized by free, fair and 
frequent elections, basic freedoms and expressions of person, the creation of a lasting and 
legitimate constitution, an autonomous civil society, legitimate political parties, and the rule of 
law, to name a few. 
 Utilizing multiple sources to gain a complete understanding of democracy, I developed 
three categories against which I analyzed the United States’ democratization attempts in Haiti 
and Iraq: Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy, Universal Characteristics of 
Democracy, and Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization. Internal Characteristics 
Associated with Democracy contains characteristics implicit to a country’s unique social, 
political, and economic contexts. It recognizes each country’s existing conditions and how these 
conditions can affect differently the possibilities for, as well as the obstacles to, democratization 
that result from these traits. This category’s associated characteristics are:  
 
INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY:  
Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)  
Homogenous society (Dahl)   
Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)  
Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and Stepan)  
Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset) 
Urbanization levels (Lipset) 
Education levels (Lipset 
Economic success (Lipset)  
Strength of civil society (Putnam)   
 
Universal Characteristics of Democracy is derived from the qualifications for democracy that 
rely on democratic scholars’ understanding of democracy as independent from how it relates to a 
certain country. The characteristics associated with this category are based on an external, 
Western model of what a liberal democracy should look like, as well as on the consensus that 
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lasting democratic institutions are necessary for a lasting and functional democracy. This 
category’s characteristics are:  
 
UNIVERSAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRACY 
Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)  
Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)  
Alternative sources of information (Dahl)  
Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)  
Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)  
Strong political leadership (Huntington)  
Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and Stepan)  
Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)   
Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)  
Legitimate political parties (Lipset)  
Justice and rule of law (Lipset)  
Liberal Constitutionalism (Zakaria)  
 
Finally, the category Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization contains characteristics that 
are based in combination on a country’s existing conditions, as well as on universal 
characteristics that would be harmful to any democracy around the world. The characteristics are 
not simply the opposites of what we desire in a democracy, they are obstacles that democracy 
planners must account for, work to mitigate, and anticipate. This category’s characteristics are:  
 
OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)  
Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)  
Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)  
Poverty (Huntington)  
Lack of stability (Huntington)  
Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)   
Viewing the election as the final step in democratization (Zakaria)  
Militarized democratization (Zakaria)  
Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic institutions (Whitehead)  
Misdirected international funding (Carothers) 
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Together, these three categories and the characteristics distinguished in each one, help us to 
understand more clearly why the United States’ democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq ended 
in failure.  
The Clinton administration ultimately failed to democratize Haiti due to an insufficient 
time commitment to rebuilding key institutions, a lack of economic development in Haiti during 
and after the intervention, and a misunderstanding of the requirements of a successful and stable 
democracy. Before the intervention, Haiti contained almost none of the Internal Characteristics 
Associated with Democracy. Due to Haiti’s political past of violent coups and corrupt dictators, 
Haiti neither developed a democratic political culture, nor did its government achieve legitimacy 
in the eyes of Haiti’s citizens. Additionally, Haiti, as the poorest nation in the Western 
hemisphere, did not have the economic characteristics associated with successful democracies. 
Haiti’s poverty contributed to its low levels of education and urbanization, neither of which were 
optimal for democratization in 1994 when the United States intervened. The Obstacles to 
Democracy and Democratization that the United States faced were numerous as well: by placing 
economic embargoes on Haiti, the Clinton administration exacerbated Haiti’s levels of poverty, 
violence, and disease, thus contributing to the refugee crisis. When the decision was finally made 
to pursue democratization in Haiti, the Clinton administration, due to domestic pressures, 
designed a mission that was insufficient in time and scope for the creation of lasting democratic 
institutions. It viewed conducting elections as the final step in democratization, ignoring other 
important aspects of democracy. Finally, when evaluating Haiti’s democracy by the Universal 
Characteristics of Democracy, in the aftermath of the intervention, we find that Haiti’s lack of 
security and control of force inhibited civil society’s freedom of expression and ability to 
participate politically. Furthermore, its absence of a functioning justice system made rule of law 
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extremely difficult, undermining the strength of Haiti’s Constitution. The Haiti case 
demonstrates that while the Clinton administration constructed opportunities for elections, 
created programs for reforming the security forces, and funneled money into reviving Haiti’s 
economy, it poorly assessed Haiti’s underlying political, economic, and social contexts, 
fundamentally misunderstood the necessary characteristics required for a stable and legitimate 
democracy, and effectively abandoned Haiti before democracy could be sustained.  
Due to an inadequate understanding of political, economic, and social contexts in Iraq, a 
misguided implementation strategy, and a disregard for the hastily constructed democratic 
institutions in the state itself, the Bush administration again failed to successfully export 
democracy to Iraq. Like Haiti, Iraq did not contain many of the Internal Characteristics 
Associated with Democracy prior to the United States’ invasion. Its autocratic governments 
traditionally flattened any civil society organizations or political participation deemed a threat to 
the existing regime, signifying a lack of democratic culture and legitimacy of government in the 
eyes of Iraq’s people. While Iraq’s economy had faired better than Haiti’s due to its oil 
resources, the economic sanctions placed on the country in light of the Gulf War eventually 
decimated its economy and contributed to Iraq’s levels of poverty, starvation, and violence. Iraq 
also has a divided society, which is significant for the study of democratization as sectarian 
tension further inhibits democracy. Furthermore, Bush created and faced various Obstacles to 
Democracy and Democratization in Iraq, most of which were due to his administration’s 
misconceptions of Iraq as well as to the damaging actions of the CPA. Bush’s view of Iraq as the 
catalyst for his plans to democratize the Middle East failed to acknowledge Iraq’s unique social, 
political, and economic contexts, thus contributing to the poor planning of democratization after 
the invasion. The CPA’s actions de-legitimized the Iraqi government, increased divides within 
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society, dramatically increased the levels of violence within the state, and viewed elections as the 
end-all be-all in its democratization efforts. The CPA failed to achieve a nuanced understanding 
of democracy and its requirements. Finally, in the aftermath of the CPA, Iraq cannot be 
categorized as having achieved a functional, stable, and legitimate democracy when analyzed 
according to the Universal Characteristics of Democracy. The Iraqi people did not truly control 
their democratization process or the construction of their constitution, and therefore the 
government was not seen as legitimate. This lack of legitimacy coupled with sectarian conflict 
contributed to the instability and violence within the state. Additionally, the dissolution of the 
Iraqi Army left a security vacuum and aggravated the insurgency. Due to the violence and 
instability it exacerbated, the ensuing civil war then inhibited freedom of expression and political 
participation. The Iraq case demonstrates that while the Bush administration removed Saddam 
Hussein from Iraq, created a new Constitution, and constructed opportunities for democratic 
elections, the administration’s ineffectual knowledge of Iraq’s historical context coupled with the 
United States’ militaristic destruction of the country’s existing institutions only led to an 
unstable, illegitimate, and ultimately unsuccessful new government.  
 
COMPARATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS OF HAITI AND IRAQ  
Now that we have achieved an understanding of the Haiti and Iraq cases as they relate to 
the identified characteristics of democracy, engaging in a comparison between the two allows us 
to consider militarized democratization as a tool of U.S. foreign policy in a larger sense. We can 
ask the question: after comparing failed U.S. democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq, what 
insights on democracy and militarized democratization can we now take away?  On the surface, 
the Haiti and Iraq appear to have very little in common: they are different geographically, 
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economically, politically, socially, and religiously. Together, however, they represent two U.S. 
democratization efforts that functioned as the foreign policy centerpieces for Presidents Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush in a post-Cold War world. Their comparison is useful if we are to 
further contextualize and understand why each state’s U.S.-instigated, fledgling democracies 
eventually collapsed. After delving into the intricacies of these interventions, and their ensuing 
failures in chapters two and three, we can now look at the distinct and important ways in which 
the two cases are similar, and the ways in which they are not, and why both administrations 
failed in their attempts to export democratic change militarily.  
 Both cases were marked by harsh economic sanctions, military engagement, the 
dismantling of key institutions, and the assumption that through the conduction of elections, 
democracy would flourish in both Haiti and Iraq. Before each democratization effort, the United 
States, in concert with the United Nations, placed economic sanctions and embargoes on Haiti 
and Iraq that ended up crippling each state’s economy, as well as aggravating the humanitarian 
crises (levels of poverty, violence, famine, and disease) that were already considered severe. The 
Clinton and Bush administrations assumed that through these policies, the Cédras and Hussein 
regimes would simply comply with the United States’ demands. We now know that these 
calculations proved devastating not to the elite members of the regimes as they were intended, 
but to the ranks of the middle and lower classes within each state, as well as to the state’s 
economic, transit, and communications infrastructures. Thus, before even attempting to create 
institutions of democratic governance, the United States damaged Haiti and Iraq so severely that 
it negatively impacted the democratization efforts post-invasion. Furthermore, during both 
Clinton and Bush’s pre-invasion planning, both administrations assumed that invading Haiti and 
Iraq on the basis of democratization would not only be welcomed, but that it would be a 
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relatively easy endeavor. Democracies, however, require more than fifteen months to build. 
Thus, despite the Clinton and Bush administration’s rhetorical commitments to democracy in 
Haiti and Iraq, each administration’s policy makers designed a mission that was insufficient in 
time and scope, setting up the trappings of democracy in each country, but failing to create and 
strengthen the key institutions and practices necessary for a successful, legitimate, and stable 
government.  
 The Clinton and Bush administrations approached the construction of democracy in Haiti 
and Iraq with the assumption that by the simple removal or addition of institutions, leaders, and 
organizations, democratization would smoothly run its course. On one hand, this is evidenced by 
Clinton’s treatment of Aristide as the primary solution to democracy in Haiti, and on the other 
hand, through Bush’s treatment of Saddam and his regime as the fundamental obstacle to 
democracy in Haiti. While the addition and subtraction of core political leaders did indeed 
influence the development of each country’s governance, viewing Aristide and Hussein in this 
absolute way prevented the other important characteristics of democracy, such as civil society’s 
right to associational autonomy, basic freedoms of person, legitimate political parties, rule of 
law, or control of force by an elected official, to be fully realized. For example, both 
administrations enacted policy measures that destroyed aspects of Haiti and Iraq’s existing 
security forces, which ultimately led to the populations of each state facing daily violence, a 
general instability of state and government, and the inability by citizens to fully participate in the 
democratic process. Iraq, as we know, had its institutions stripped by the CPA in a way that more 
severely damaged its democratization prospects than the actions taken by the UN coalition in 
Haiti.  
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 Finally, the most distinct and important way in which the U.S. democratization efforts in 
Haiti and Iraq reflect similar failures of military intervention is the notion that for each attempt, 
the Clinton and Bush administrations assumed that with the advent of elections, democracy had 
been achieved. We now know, however, that the characteristics of a successful democracy 
extend far beyond constructing free, fair, and frequent elections. That is not to say that elections 
are not vital in a democratic society, but that other characteristics of democratic governance (a 
vibrant civil society, personal freedom and liberty, a legitimate and lasting constitution, strong 
political leadership and control of force, and legitimate political parties) are of equal importance 
as well. It is easy to define democracy through an election, because elections are relatively easy 
to measure. However, when policy makers prioritize elections over every other aspect of 
democracy, attempts at democratization will not be successful in the long-term. As we also noted 
in these cases, there were U.S. domestic election concerns that truncated democratization efforts 
in Haiti and Iraq, and thus sped up the timetable for democratic elections in each country. When 
a timelines for democratization efforts are shortened, it is seen by our democratization scholars 
as an obstacle to democracy. Presidents Bush and Clinton declared democracy and freedom in 
Haiti and Iraq upon the conduction of elections in part because they needed to show the world 
(and their constituencies) that the United States had won itself a victory.  
 While the similarities between these two failed democratization efforts reveal important 
patterns for future policy makers, should the United States again attempt to democratize a 
foreign country, it is necessary to illuminate the ways in which these two cases are different as 
well. First and foremost, Clinton’s invasion of Haiti exhibited multilateral engagement with the 
approval of the United Nations, whereas Bush’s invasion of Iraq was only supported largely by 
the United States itself, and secondarily by Britain—it is an example of unilateral action seen in 
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Bush’s preemptive national security strategy. While neither of these cases were completely 
supported by the world or by the United States, this international context is important to consider 
because it can lend or detract legitimacy from the military engagement, and if we can recall, 
legitimacy is universally considered an important characteristic of democracy.  
Additionally, the conditions in each country prior to invasion were different. Iraq, for 
example, is divided along sectarian lines in a way that Haiti is not. Haiti, however, had a poor 
economic situation even before the United States placed embargoes on the state whereas Iraq’s 
economic status pre-sanctions was relatively strong. It is critical to remember and acknowledge 
these differences, because although these cases allow for a powerful comparison of the mistakes 
made by US policy makers in their democratization efforts, the results of each attempt are not 
exactly the same. Treating them as such would diminish the unique conditions and structural 
limitations in Haiti and Iraq that impacted each country’s failure to democratize. It is evident, 
however, that neither “Operation Uphold Democracy” nor “Operation Iraqi Freedom” 
established democracy in Haiti and Iraq.   
As we have seen, between the U.S. policy makers’ mistakes throughout “Operation 
Uphold Democracy” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in Haiti and Iraq, we can draw important 
conclusions about the nature of democratization attempts through the use of military intervention 
after the end of the Cold War. It remains apparent that if policy makers do not pay attention to 
the internal and external characteristics necessary for a sustainable democracy, and the obstacles 
to democratization that occur along the way, we cannot expect future military endeavors to be 
successful. While this thesis focuses on examining explicit failures in the United States’ post-
Cold War history of promoting and exporting democracy around the world, it does not suggest 
that we rule out supporting democratizing initiatives entirely. It does contend, however, that we 
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must examine carefully the ways in which we must modify our democratization practices if the 
U.S. hopes to promote democratization abroad. Yes, the Haiti and Iraq cases demonstrate that 
militarized democratization alone is not viable. Nevertheless, these cases do not signify that 
other forms of support for democracy should be ruled out. To identify which forms of support 
would lead to successful democratization, however, requires further research. One thing remains 
clear: if democratization is to occur successfully, it will not be on the back of a tank.   
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ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY 
-Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)  
-Homogenous society (Dahl)   
-Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)  
-Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and 
Stepan)  
-Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset) 
-Urbanization levels (Lipset) 
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-Economic success (Lipset)  
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-Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)  
-Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)  
-Alternative sources of information (Dahl)  
-Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically 
(Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
-Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)  
-Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)  
-Strong political leadership (Huntington)  
-Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and 
Stepan)  
-Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz 
and Stepan)   
-Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
-Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)  
-Legitimate political parties (Lipset)  
-Justice and rule of law (Lipset)  
-Liberal Constitutionalism (Zakaria)  
OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
-Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)  
-Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)  
-Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)  
-Poverty (Huntington)  
-Lack of stability (Huntington)  
-Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)   
-Viewing the election as the final step in democratization 
(Zakaria)  
-Militarized democratization (Zakaria)  
-Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic 
institutions (Whitehead)  
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